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Industrial Control Systems are vulnerable to integrity attacks because of connectivity to 
the external Internet and trusted internal networking components that can become 
compromised. Integrity attacks can be modeled, analyzed, and sometimes remedied by 
exploiting properties of physical devices and reasoning about the trust worthiness of ICS 
communication components. 
Industrial control systems (ICS) monitor and control the processes of public 
utility that society depends on – the electric power grid, oil and gas pipelines, 
transportation, and water facilities. Attacks that impact the operations of these critical 
assets could have devastating consequences. The complexity and desire to interconnect 
ICS components have introduced vulnerabilities and attack surfaces that previously did 
not exist. 
Cyber attacks against ICS are increasing and have demonstrated an ability to 
create effects in the physical domain.  The numerous communication paths, various 
ingress and egress points, diversity of technology and operating requirements provide 
myriad opportunities for a motivated adversary. Current defense strategies and guidelines 
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focus on defense-in-depth to protect critical resources at network boundaries by 
presenting an attacker with various challenges to overcome.  
Our findings indicate a paradigm shift is required to thwart advanced threats in 
ICS.  ICS operations focus on availability, safety, and reliability.  Current ICS attacks can 
penetrate or circumvent external barriers recommended by defense-in-depth strategies to 
facilitate integrity attacks.  Inside these boundaries, internal network traffic and 
components are trusted, which can be manipulated by an attacker to compromise the 
integrity of network traffic.     
The automatic evaluation of integrity is a difficult problem in the ICS 
environment with fundamental issues that are yet to be adequately addressed, including: 
(a) sufficient methods for detecting integrity errors, and (b) interpretation and correlation 
of interdependent data to improve trustworthiness.   
This research investigates how to detect and locate integrity errors in a system by 
correlating state values from network devices.  The specific problem to be addressed is 
how to use physical properties of independent sensors to derive a holistic view of the 
system to discern system state.  A method capable of detecting intentional and 
unintentional integrity issues, which can result from cyber attacks, is necessary to 
supplement current strategies that blindly trust internal network data. 
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This research examines the theory, application and results for a new Byzantine 
Industrial Control System (BICS) algorithm that provides security for an ICS in a hostile 
environment.  BICS provides a method to: 
 Detect and locate integrity errors in an ICS using properties of devices that do not 
communicate directly. 
 Enable a holistic view of the system in a fashion that automatically correlates 
untrusted system parameters from compromised nodes to detect integrity errors. 
 Allow operators of networks to function securely and confidently without 
degrading overall system performance by improving trustworthiness of data and 
providing an ability to isolate compromised nodes.
vii 
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Industrial Control Systems are vulnerable to integrity attacks because of connectivity to 
the external Internet and trusted internal networking components that can become 
compromised. Integrity attacks can be modeled, analyzed, and sometimes remedied by 
exploiting properties of physical devices and reasoning about the trust worthiness of ICS 
communication components. 
ICS have been plagued with intentional and unintentional attacks over the past 
several years and devastating consequences have resulted when data integrity has been 
compromised.  In Fork Shoals, North Carolina a pipeline rupture caused 957,600 gallons 
of oil to spill into a nearby river and surrounding areas causing over $20 million dollars 
in damage.  Operators did not respond appropriately to operational emergencies and 
conflicting data contributed to abnormal conditions, ultimately causing the events [1].   
Additionally, in Bellingham, Washington a pipeline ruptured and released 237,000 
gallons of gasoline into a creek.  The gasoline ignited and caused 3 deaths, 8 injuries, and 
over $45 million dollars in damage.  The security and performance of the control system 
contributed to the compromise of the system as the conflicting data was not identified in 
a timely manner [2].  In each scenario, the integrity of the system was manipulated and 
the operators did not have proper situational awareness to prevent devastation. 
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Industrial control systems (ICS) monitor and control the processes of public 
utility infrastructures that society depends on—the electric power grid, oil and gas 
pipelines, transportation, and water facilities. Attacks that impact the operations of these 
critical assets could have devastating consequences. The complexity and desire to 
interconnect ICS components have introduced vulnerabilities and attack surfaces that 
previously did not exist, causing a 900% increase in cyber security incidents in the past 4 
years (Figure 3) [3] [4].  Cyber attacks are increasing in sophistication, and have 
demonstrated an ability to create effects in the physical domain [5]. Most notably, ICS 
associated with critical infrastructure have proven susceptible to targeted attacks.   
The main information assurance considerations for ICS are confidentiality, 
integrity, and availability.  Integrity is a necessary principle that is sometimes 
overlooked.  In addition, this principle competes with the necessary availability and 
safety requirements that pertain to ICS operations.  Integrity must be addressed to prevent 
devastation like the events experienced at Fork Shoals and Bellingham.  As a result, this 
research focuses solely on integrity attacks.   
The use of firewalls, intrusion detection systems, and other defense mechanisms 
can help tremendously to protect nodes from threats that affect data integrity.  However, 
advanced threats, sophisticated attacks, and unintentional manipulation can leave systems 
in inconsistent states that are often not detected by existing defense solutions.  This 
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research evaluates current security solutions. New methods are formulated to identify and 
characterize conflicting data that result from the compromise of integrity. 
The automatic evaluation of an integrity violation is a difficult problem in the ICS 
environment with fundamental issues that have yet to be addressed adequately, including: 
(a) development of sufficient methods for preventing and detecting integrity errors, (b) 
interpretation and correlation of sensor data to improve trustworthiness.   
This dissertation introduces an algorithm for detecting, correlating, and locating 
integrity errors in sensor data in ICS context.  Specifically, the goals of the research are 
to: 
1. Identify and define integrity in the context of ICS. 
2. Evaluate current strategies and shortfalls for defending against integrity attacks in 
networks.   
3. Develop an approach to correlate sensor input values, and evaluate consistency.   
4. Develop a prototype application to demonstrate the utility of an integrity 
evaluation algorithm.   
1.1 Research Contributions 
The primary contributions of this dissertation are discussed briefly below and are 
later extrapolated to demonstrate additional value.  
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This research addresses malicious faults, sometimes referred to as Byzantine 
faults in distributed systems, which contribute to the integrity problem in the ICS 
environment.  The novel approach is to use physical properties to discern system state. In 
the sense of integrity attacks, the discernment of process state and violations of 
constraints to be satisfied by the system state can be used to identify compromised field 
devices.  Byzantine Industrial Control System (BICS) is an algorithm developed for 
identifying and resolving integrity issues of ICS stemming from Byzantine faults.  
Specifically, the framework uses physical evidence and properties of sensors that do not 
communicate directly to determine the state of the system and resolve conflicting inputs.   
Previous research has attempted to prevent the manipulation of system integrity 
by applying defense-in-depth strategies, consisting of layered protection.  Byzantine 
faults have been explored and redundant architectures have been proposed to mitigate 
inconsistencies.  Additional research has identified interdependent components and 
leveraged reliability metrics to estimate failure susceptibility and to predict failures.   
However, the previous research does not integrate existing security frameworks 
with physical evidence in the ICS environment to develop a correlation-based integrity 
evaluation algorithm.  Properties including interdependency, in ICS, are leveraged by 
BICS to enable correlation between component state values to discern system state.   
The BICS framework will demonstrate how to 1) Detect and locate integrity 
errors in an ICS using properties of devices that do not communicate directly, 2) Enable a 
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holistic view of the system in a fashion that automatically correlates untrusted system 
parameters from compromised nodes to detect integrity errors, and 3) Allow operators of 
networks to function securely and confidently without degrading overall system 
performance by improving trustworthiness of data and providing an ability to isolate 
compromised nodes.  This research ultimately enables an operator to understand the state 
of the system by providing overall situational awareness.  Successful implementations 
can help prevent situations like those described in Fork Shoals. 
1.2 Dissertation Organization 
This dissertation is organized as follows.  Chapter 2 reviews seminal and recent 
works that provide necessary background pertaining to ICS, information security and 
detailed analysis of existing defense strategies in the context of ICS.  Chapter 3 describes 
the development of BICS, a new framework and methodology for detecting and resolving 
conflicting data within ICS.  Chapter 4 defines a method for simulating attacks and 
protection in ICS that incorporates BICS in order to understand and evaluate its 
robustness when the requirements of BICS are not met.  Chapter 5 provides configuration 
details and results of formal simulation experiments. Chapter 6 provides additional 
analysis of BICS and considers engineering advantages and applications of the 
framework correlated to other research.  Finally, Chapter 7 concludes the dissertation and 
presents areas for further study. 
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II. LITERATURE REVIEW 
This chapter provides an overview of the background principles associated with 
ICS, information security, and corollary security models.  Section 1 provides an overview 
of ICS and critical infrastructure and provides information covering user roles, 
components, operators and mission areas.  Section 2 introduces cyber threats and 
provides brief examples for each category of attack.  Section 3 reviews detailed case 
studies of intentional and unintentional cyber incidents resulting in devastating 
consequences in the ICS domain.  Section 4 reviews defense strategies and methods for 
protecting critical networks in addition to an integrity evaluation model designed for 
distributed systems.  Section 5 discusses graph-based models and model-based diagnosis 
that will be tailored for ICS.  Section 6 summarizes the chapter. 
2.1 ICS and Critical Infrastructure 
ICS is a term that can represent several different control systems such as a process 
control system (PCS), distributed control system (DCS), and supervisory control and data 
acquisition (SCADA) system [6].  Components of ICS are found in many critical 
infrastructures defined in Section 2.1.3. 
2.1.1 Overview  
ICS are distributed in nature with asset owners, operators, controllers, and sensors 
located miles apart.  Effective communication with endpoint devices is critical for the 
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proper operation of the system.  ICS allow an operator to assess current status of a 
production process, remotely monitor and control systems.  This activity can be 
automated or semi-automated and can require frequent, regular, or immediate 
intervention at crucial times.  Operators are required to set parameters and to make 
adjustments.   
For illustrative purposes, consider an HVAC system with automated controls.  A 
thermostat turns the system on and off at set environmental and temperature conditions.  
An individual can modify the system parameters to change thermal conditions.  Often, 
HVAC systems are connected to the Internet to enable remote access and adjustments.  
An attacker may compromise the remote connection to send alternative commands or 
modify system parameters to alter the HVAC system operations.   
2.1.2 ICS Components 
ICS consist of many entities including operators, Master Terminal Units (MTU), 
Remote Terminal Units (RTU), data historians, sensors, and actuators [7].  In general, 
operators interface with the system from a Human System Interface (HSI).  MTUs 
communicate with the computer-based RTUs using wireless radio signals or landline 
modems.  RTUs communicate directly with sensors and actuators to obtain readings or to 
set parameters.  Sensors measure field equipment conditions and actuators change field 
equipment conditions.  Data historians are centralized databases which store data such as 
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meter values for trending, logs, and configuration information for all essential processes.  
Figure 1 displays many of these elements in addition to other components. 
 
Figure 1: ICS General System Layout [8]. 
 
The control center generally consists of several key components including an 
HMI, engineering workstations, data historian, control servers, and communication 
routers [8].  An HMI allows human operators to monitor the state of the system and to 
remotely modify control settings when necessary.  The engineering workstations allow 
access to the Programming Logic Controller (PLC).  Communication routers facilitate the 
transfer of messages and data between the networks and devices for ICS communication. 
Several types of data communication networks exist to serve many purposes such 
as providing access between business and operational networks [9].  Utility-owned wide-
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area and field-area networks send and receive operational measurement and control 
signals between a control center, substations, and sensors.  They rely on wired (fiber 
optic and copper), wireless (cellular), and radio frequency or microwave communication.  
Commercial wide-area, field-area, and local networks are similar to utility-owned 
networks but allow for communications among corporate data centers.  Public telephone 
networks and the Internet send pricing signals, daily generation schedules, and home 
energy usage to remote locations.  Satellite communication networks are used when other 
methods are costly or unavailable. 
Field sites generally consist of RTUs or PLCs which control actuators and 
communicate with sensors [7].  Field devices include RTUs, PLCs, Intelligent Electronic 
Devices (IED), modems, and wireless cards [8].  PLCs are small computers designed to 
perform logic functions executed by electrical hardware (e.g. relays, switches, and 
mechanical timers/counters) and have evolved to control complex processes [7].  
Intelligent Electronic Devices (IED) are “smart” sensors or actuators that have the 
capability to communicate with other devices and to perform local processing and control 
for automated functionality when necessary.  Modems enable devices to communicate by 
converting between serial digital data and a signal suitable for transmission over a 
telephone line [7].  They enable long distance serial communications between MTUs and 
remote field devices.  Finally, wireless cards provide an interface to allow networks to 
communicate over the air. 
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The ICS components discussed here can be targeted and attacked.  Complexity 
and desire to interconnect ICS components have introduced vulnerabilities and attack 
surfaces that previously did not exist.  Remote intrusions into an ICS can facility integrity 
attacks and yield a potentially unsafe environment.  Section 2.3 and later sections 
describe integrity attacks in the context of ICS components in addition to situations when 
field devices are compromised.  Case studies are provided to specify the expected 
behavior of a component, the attack, and the compromised behavior. 
2.1.3 ICS Mission Areas 
Many ICS are associated with critical infrastructure and critical missions.  
Examples include oil and gas facilities, water and irrigation systems, transportation 
systems, electric systems, and building automation.  Oil or gas production facilities 
consist of wells, gathering pipelines, fluid measurement equipment and pumps [10].  
Pipelines for gas, oil, chemicals, and water are controlled by opening and closing valves 
and starting and stopping pumps.  Pipelines are sensitive to leaks and market conditions 
and can change very frequently.  Electric transmission systems are controlled by opening 
and closing switches and must respond quickly to load changes in the event of a blackout 
or market changes.  Irrigation systems are controlled by opening and closing simple 
valves and require metering for data gathering for proper billing.  There are many 
additional applications for ICS; however, these basic examples provide a basis that will 
later be used as a foundation for understanding impacts in adverse conditions.  Specific 
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attacks, effects from unintentional manipulation of system components, and other use 
cases are described in Section 2.2.3 and Section 2.3.  
2.1.4 Smart Grid Conceptual Model 
The conceptual model provided in this section encompasses all the aspects 
previously discussed in the context of ICS.  The following smart grid example shows the 
operational intricacies between the domains, actors, and individual components at each 
level.  This example accentuates the complexity and potential security issues inherent in 
the architecture. 
 
Figure 2: SMART Grid Conceptual Model [11]. 
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Figure 2 represents a notional model of example domains and actors associated 
with the ICS environment. The domains consist of customers, markets, service providers, 
operations, bulk generation, transmission, and distribution. Actors include devices, 
systems, or programs that make decisions and exchange information necessary for 
performing applications [11].   At the ICS level, each individual network can be separated 
physically or logically depending on the underlying architecture.  The interconnection of 
asset owners, companies, consumers, and customers adds to the overall system 
complexity.  Finally, connections to the Internet provide convenience for business owners 
and operators, but can introduce potential security risks. 
2.2 ICS Threats and Security 
The increase in ICS connectivity and complexity has led to the increase in cyber 
security issues.  Myriad threat vectors, including non-typical network protocols, are 
becoming an issue [12].  For example, in the smart grid, it is common to find commercial 
telephone lines, wireless networks, optical fiber, and Internet connections.  The diversity 
and lack of interoperability among various communication protocols cause problems for 
anyone who tries to establish secure communications to and from a substation [12].  
Numerous communication paths, various ingress and egress points, and diversity of 
control systems provide many opportunities for a motivated adversary to perform a cyber 
attack.  This effect is amplified as cyber attacks are increasing in sophistication.  These 
paths enable access to devices, including PLCs, which are susceptible to integrity attacks. 
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2.2.1 Cyber Security Considerations 
Mini-computers have been used in ICS since the early 1960s [7].  At the turn of 
the 21
st
 century, it became commonplace for owners to connect ICS to the Internet to 
facilitate remote access for ease of monitoring and control.  Since the public discovery of 
Stuxnet in 2010, cyber threats for ICS have been a growing area of concern [5].  Device 
and system integrity is compromised by manipulating sensor or control signals using 
cyber means [13] [14].  Owners and operators of ICS receive constant scrutiny from 
security experts due to limited security practices [15].   
 Government organizations and standards bodies recommend multiple layers of 
defense, later defined as defense-in-depth in Chapter 2.4.1, as the primary means for 
achieving information assurance in computer networks and ICS communications [16] 
[17] [18].  Multiple layers of defense, including DMZs, firewalls, intrusion detection and 
intrusion prevention systems can be established to detect and mitigate many security 
issues.  However, additional mechanisms are necessary to protect against cyber attacks 
and other compromises of system integrity that are not prevented or mitigated by 
defense-in-depth techniques.  Failure to detect integrity errors in a system can lead to 
devastating consequences as demonstrated in the earlier Fork Shoals and Bellingham 
examples.  In these examples, existing defense-in-depth strategies would not help with 
these two cases.  Additional examples are described in Sections 2.2.3 and 2.3. 
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There is a lack of understanding of cyber risks associated with ICS environment.  
Despite emphasis on defense-in-depth strategies [8] [18] [19] [20] the rate of ICS attacks 
continue to increase [4] [21] [22] [23].   Figure 3 highlights the number of ICS-related 
cyber incidents reported to ICS-CERT, a leading government organization in the ICS 
security community.  Over the past 4 years, there has been a 9-fold increase in reported 
cyber security incidents [3] [4]. Despite recent emphasis on cyber security, ICS prove no 
more resilient or secure.  Therefore additional methods are needed to address cyber 
security concerns. 
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ICS Cyber Incidents by Year 
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ICS inherently trust system inputs for proper operation.  As a result, manipulation 
of parameters readily cascade to improper functionality or system failure.  Failure to 
identify an appropriate safe system state and converge to it in a critical ICS leave 
operators and automated systems in an unstable situation that often leads to loss of 
product and efficiency, financial loss, loss of life and other significant damage as 
demonstrated in Chapter 2.3.1.  Decision methods are not currently in place to assist 
operators in identifying conflicting information.  As a result, operators are often unable to 
resolve many anomalous situations due to lack of situational awareness and the absence 
of holistic system knowledge.  This research provides a framework to fill this security 
gap.  Specific details of a new security solution will be discussed in Chapter III. 
Many ICS have been exploited in the past several years and security issues are 
starting to be realized.  Igure et al. [24] discusses security issues in SCADA networks 
stemming from the general architecture in addition to exploitable properties of common 
communication protocols.  The authors highlight ongoing problems such as 
interconnectivity between ICS devices, corporate networks, and the Internet and suggest 
enhancing defense-in-depth strategies by improving firewalls, IDSs, and operating 
system security.  Udassin [25] highlights control system attack vectors and examples 
including emphasis on field sites and corporate networks.  Concepts including physical 
security, control center compromise, protocol analysis, and fuzzing applications are 
discussed to achieve desired effects.  Finally, Leverette [26] used the SHODAN search 
engine [27] to identify nearly 10,000 ICS-related devices on the Internet from 2009-2011.  
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This search engine identifies HVAC systems, building management systems, meters, and 
other ICS devices or SCADA servers of interest that are connected to the Internet.  
Attackers may use this information in conjunction with exploit databases to facilitate 
remote attacks. 
2.2.2 Traditional IT & ICS Network Security 
Traditional information technology (IT) and ICS networks may appear to be very 
similar as they share similar technologies.  Therefore, a common approach to cyber 
security may seem reasonable.  However, upon closer observation there are many 
differences between traditional IT and ICS networks.  Figure 4 highlights approximate 
dates of events in history as they pertain to cyber security and ICS.  Eventually, these two 
domains merge and cyber security weaknesses in networks become realized. 
In the early 1960s mini-computers were first used in ICS although it was not until 
the 1980s that personal computers became common [7].  A decade later in the 1990s, the 
public Internet became very popular and computer viruses began to appear as the concept 
of cyber security was born.  In the early 21
st
 century, ICS and IT domains began to 
overlap as ICS-devices became connected to the public Internet.  Less than 10 years later, 
the sophistication of computer viruses had grown to target specific devices, even PLC in 
ICS, connected to a network [21].  With the rapid emergence of cyber attack capabilities, 
it is important to identify and combat sophisticated attacks.  It has been found that 
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solutions were not always consistent as methods for protecting traditional IT and ICS 
systems varied. 
 
Figure 4: ICS and Cyber Security Timeline. 
 
There are many differences between traditional IT and ICS network security [28].  
In the context of cyber security, the information assurance principles of confidentiality, 
integrity, and availability – also known as the CIA triad – are evaluated.  Corporate IT 
focuses primarily on confidentiality, followed by integrity and availability.  In the IT 
environment, protecting sensitive data from loss or disclosure is most important whereas 
a web server outage or an email delay is tolerable.  On the contrary, control systems 
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prioritize the triad in the order of availability, integrity, and confidentiality.  The real-time 
nature of ICS requires availability to be the highest priority [16].  There can be dangers or 
mass loss of revenue if systems do not respond in real time.  Integrity of data is also 
equally important since conflicting system data can cause devastating consequences.  In 
both domains, security experts recommend defense-in-depth strategies to secure both IT 
and ICS networks from cyber threats [28].  Detailed defense strategies, including 
defense-in-depth, are discussed in later sections.  This research will specifically address 
integrity attacks in the ICS domain. 
2.2.3 Categories of Cyber Attacks 
In general, attacks can be targeted or indiscriminate [29].  If a trusted component 
becomes compromised as the result of either a targeted or indiscriminate attack, an 
attacker may be able to gain access to other components and create cascading effects on 
dependent nodes.  While the popular defense-in-depth techniques may deter some 
indiscriminate attacks, these strategies alone are not sufficient against targeted attacks.  In 
some cases, additional mechanisms are necessary and a holistic view of the system is 
required to identify and evaluate an attack.  Figure 5 depicts a graph using data provided 





Figure 5: ICS-CERT Incident Reports by Sector in 2010 [4]. 
 
2.2.3.1 Indiscriminate Attack Examples 
ICS have seen an increase in intentional and unintentional cyber attacks over the 
past decade [21].  Several reported incidents are described below which highlight system 
damage from worms, virus, and other malicious cyber attacks.  The attacks in this section 
are referred to as indiscriminate attacks which may have been prevented with proper 
defense-in-depth elements.  An indiscriminate attack is typically not directed at a specific 
company, individual, or process.  This class of attacks may consist of a common virus 
distributed over email or drive-by downloads from malicious websites that infect random 
machines.   
The events involving the Browns Ferry nuclear plant are indicative of an 
indiscriminate attack.  In this scenario, excessive network traffic caused problems with 
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recirculation pumps.  Specifically, a spike in network traffic caused a programmable 
logic controller to crash, resulting in the failure of the pumps and forcing a reactor 
shutdown [30].  Many non-nuclear facilities have also experienced similar broadcast 
storms that have impacted the operation of power plants, refineries, and energy 
management systems [31].  These attacks are considered indiscriminate since they 
arbitrarily impact devices that cannot handle the vast amount of data. 
In 2003, the Sobig virus infected computers at the Amtrak dispatching 
headquarters.  The virus caused signaling systems to shut down and halted several trains 
between Pennsylvania and South Carolina [32].  The Slammer worm penetrated a 
computer at an Ohio nuclear plant in 2003, causing the safety monitoring system to be 
disabled for nearly five hours [33].  
In 2005, the Taum Sauk Water Storage Dam suffered a catastrophic failure 
releasing a billion gallons of water.  This event likely resulted from improper pump 
operation.  According to AmerenUE, the gauges at the dam read differently than the 
gauges at the Osage plant which monitors and operates the Taum Sauk plant remotely.  
The stations are linked together using a network of microwave towers, and there were no 
operators on-site at Taum Sauk [21].  In this case, operators were not able to resolve 
conflicting data. 
In August of 2012, Saudi Aramco, the world’s biggest oil company, was attacked 
by the Shamoon virus which spread across the corporate network and erased 30,000 hard 
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drives [34].  According to reports, the virus did not directly impact the control systems or 
oil-field data but instead affected the corporate network. This was only one of several 
attacks that have indirectly affected control systems and related networks.  A few months 
earlier in April 2012, the National Iranian Oil Company, the second largest crude 
producer, was also affected by malicious software [35].  
2.2.3.2 Targeted Attack Examples 
Targeted attacks are designed to affect a specific person, network, process, or end 
device on a network.  Targeted attacks are typically more complex than indiscriminate 
attacks.  Developers of targeted attacks likely possess deep insider knowledge of the 
environment, such as architecture, software, and the interaction between components 
[36].  Such sophisticated attacks are becoming increasingly popular and are difficult to 
combat due to the technical ingenuity and complexity [29].  Targeted attacks, including 
those that rely on custom malware, may evade traditional intrusion detection and other 
defensive systems that rely solely on signatures.   
In 2001, a disgruntled former employee launched a wireless attack on a sewage 
facility in Maroochy Shire, Queensland, which released millions of gallons of raw 
sewage into parks and rivers [37]. The employee used authorized credentials and 
knowledge of the operating environment to achieve specific effects. 
22 
 
2.3 Case Studies 
Many additional significant cyber incidents have occurred over the past several 
years [22].  Fortunately, the majority of historical events are the result of secondary 
effects and the damage has been minor.  The absence of an overwhelming disaster, 
however, only perpetuates the false sense of security.  Indeed, more sophisticated, 
targeted attacks could result in significant disruption or mass casualties.  Therefore, 
additional methods to detect and prevent integrity attacks in an ICS are necessary. 
Within the past several years, ICS have routinely experienced problems related to 
system integrity [21].  As a notional example, pressure in a pipeline may increase due to a 
clog in the system, high input rates, low outflow rates, or a number of other conditions.  
Pipelines are limited in the amount of pressure they can withstand.  Too much pressure 
can cause a pipeline rupture or an explosion.  To alleviate anomalous situations including 
over-pressure situations, an operator must interact with the system to manipulate 
distribution.  Failure to act can lead to devastating consequences as observed several 
times in the past [1] [38].  It is possible and probable for system integrity to become 
compromised while giving the appearance of a stable system.  Specific examples are 
described in the next section to highlight the devastation that can result from intentional 
or unintentional cyber attack. 
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2.3.1 Bellingham Oil Pipeline Rupture 
In Bellingham, Washington a steel pipeline owned by Olympic Pipe Line 
Company ruptured and released about 237,000 gallons of gasoline into a creek.  The 
gasoline ignited and burned 1.5 miles along the creek killing three individuals and 
injuring several others [2].  A user controlling the system had modified parameters and 
related structure of the primary and backup databases just prior to the incident which 
unknowingly caused problems several minutes later.  The SCADA system that controllers 
used to operate the pipeline became unresponsive, making it difficult for controllers to 
analyze pipeline conditions and make timely responses to operational problems.  The 
safety board concluded that the degraded SCADA performance experienced by the 
pipeline controllers resulted from the database development work that was done on the 
SCADA system.  Total property damages exceeded $45 million [2].  A map of the oil 
pipeline in Figure 6 shows the geographical distribution of system components from the 
Bellingham incident; this distribution in common of most ICS configurations.  The events 




Figure 6: Geographical Distribution of Oil Pipeline in Bellingham Incident [2]. 
 
Key events have been extracted from the Bellingham incident and are listed in Table 1 
for additional context. 
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Table 1: Summary of Key Events from the Bellingham Oil Pipeline Rupture [2]. 
Date – Time Event 
June 10 – 
3:00PM 
New records created for SCADA historical database to hold pump vibration 
data 
June 10 – 
3:00PM 
Meanwhile, the controller using the SCADA system prepared to discontinue 
product delivery to Tosco facility and initiate delivery to ARCO terminal 
June 10 – 
3:10PM 
Error logs initially showed no errors, but soon showed historical database 
errors 
 Checked format of new records and found no errors – determined problem 
from alternate cause 
June 10 – 
3:17PM 
Delivery points were switched and pressure began to build upstream from 
the delivery point, as expected 
June 10 – 
3:18PM 
Attempted command to start second pump at unattended Woodinville station 
failed 
 At same time, SCADA system displayed alarm at Allen station due to high 
discharge pressure 
 Almost simultaneously, controller operating other pipeline section noted the 
system had become unresponsive to his commands and reported to system 
administrator 
 Attempted to delete new records that had been created 
June 10 – 
3:23PM 
Electrician on duty was contacted and asked to manually shut down a 
pumping unit because communications were lost and it could not be 
controlled remotely 
June 10 – 
3:24PM 
Uncommanded shutdown of the Bayview terminal, increasing pressure, and 
sounding high pressure alarm and initiating the closure of the inlet block 
valve 
June 10 – 
3:29PM 
Pressure rose then dropped as block valve closed then stopped product flow 
into Bayview; rupture soon occurred after drastic pressure changes 
 
Events of the Bellingham Pipeline incident were evaluated by the National 
Transportation Safety Board and contextual information was gathered to understand the 
problem. A notional architecture of the oil pipeline was abstracted and is presented in 




Figure 7: Notional Oil Pipeline Network Diagram. 
 
The Olympic Oil Pipeline network did not consist of layered defenses, which 
would have represented an attempt to secure the system using defense-in-depth 
principles.  Lack of basic security defenses and direct connectivity to the Internet left the 
SCADA system vulnerable to accidental or intentional impact.  The board concluded 
there was not sufficient evidence to confirm a remote intrusion by an unauthorized user. 
However, the lack of basic security features related to the SCADA system may have 
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allowed such an intrusion to occur. [2]  For example, a bridge device connected the 
SCADA control room with the company’s administrative network. 
Investigators concluded database changes were the ultimate cause of the pipeline 
rupture and in this case it was assumed that a witting insider caused the problem.  The 
study revealed that common logins, all with system privileges, did exist [2].  Also, the 
system was connected to Internet from an outside network.  While the SCADA logs were 
intact, computer logs from the primary network were missing without a sufficient 
explanation [2].  This could suggest tampering or intentional malicious activity.  In 
similar cyber attacks, adversaries have sought to attack related components, including 
databases, to achieve similar effects [39] [21].   
Applying best practices and defensive elements to the Olympic Oil Pipeline 
system may have provided additional security to the SCADA system.  Reduced security 
practices enabled the insider to corrupt a critical database.  These very same activities 
could have been launched by a remote cyber attacker to achieve the same effect. 
2.3.2 Fork Shoals Oil Pipeline Rupture 
In Fork Shoals, SC an oil pipeline controller acted on misleading system 
information that unknowingly conflicted with the true state of the system [1].   The 
conflicting information prompted an action from the operator that ultimately triggered an 
oil pipeline rupture costing several million dollars [1].  The operator acted on incorrect 
visual cues which unknowingly conflicted with the normal operating conditions.  In this 
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scenario, a green light illuminated on the SCADA system console, indicating the pump 
was starting.   In reality, the pump did not start.  When additional actions were taken by 
the controller, the oil pipeline ruptured.  Although this incident was unintentional, it 
demonstrates what an adversary can do to create conflicting data in the system.   
 
Figure 8: Fork Shoals Controller Workstation for Operations [1]. 
 
Figure 8 depicts a work station from which controllers monitored and operated oil 
pipelines in the Fork Shoals incident [1].  Remote facilities offer an ability to monitor and 
control processes from many field sites.  Several monitors display real-time information 
for each connected field site.  The number system screens available typically exceed the 
number of available monitors to display them.  As a result, operators may choose display 
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the most critical screens front and center.  The controller for Fork Shoals used the 
configuration depicted in Figure 8; however, this monitoring equipment was not enough 
to prevent the pipeline rupture [1]. 
The controller did not have situational awareness, accurate system state 
information, or complementary data to verify the initial readings.  If this information had 
been available, the operator may have been able to resolve the conflicting data to gain a 
better understanding of the overall situation prior to taking additional actions.  Instead, 
the controller had to rely and ultimately act on the limited system information.  The 
integrity of the system was compromised unbeknownst to the controller.  The controller 
had made the proper decisions based on the anticipated system state; however there were 
no further checks or balances to resolve the conflicting system information.   
Like the previous Bellingham example, checking for consistency among the states 
of physical devices in the Fork Shoals incident could have helped prevent the situation 
that transpired.  Also, while these events were not proved to be carried out by a remote 
adversary, these same scenarios could have been orchestrated by an attacker launching a 
cyber attack.  
2.3.3 Stuxnet 
The Stuxnet virus, discovered in 2010, is a prime example of sophisticated, 
targeted malware that bypassed traditional security defenses and used USB thumb drives 
to spread across networks [21].  Examination of Stuxnet shows the malware was 
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introduced into the target network, consisting of a Windows PC, using a USB drive and 
an unsuspecting human user.  From the compromised machine, the malware propagated 
via the enterprise network through additional USB drives, infected PLC programming 
project files, network shares, and other methods utilizing several zero-day vulnerabilities 
in the Windows environment until it reached a control PC [5].   
Stuxnet masked its presence on each PC by creating a root-kit and removing itself 
from USB devices after a set number of infections.  Once the malware identified a control 
PC running WinCC or Step 7 PLC control software, alternate code was prepared, 
injected, and ultimately transferred to the specified PLC [5].  The payload of Stuxnet was 
the compiled code that reprogrammed the end target PLC to manipulate the industrial 
processes.  Disabling pumps, progressively activating turbines, and modifying speeds 
were a few of the Stuxnet operations that ultimately disrupted operations. 
Stuxnet demonstrated a new class and dimension of malware as it acted as a 
worm, virus, malware and exploit in a single package.  Stuxnet used a multi-staged attack 
vector to propagate to the targeted PLC. The worm was first introduced in the Windows 
environment.  This is significant since the initial target was from a different operating 
system and environment than the end-target.  It is difficult to notice infections from 
attacks such as Stuxnet on non-targeted systems since its presence is masked and does not 
impact the functionality of non-ICS operations.   
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2.4 Defense and Detection 
As ICS grow in complexity and are connected to business and external networks, 
the number of security issues and the associated risks grow [19].  Cyber attacks are 
increasing in sophistication and new guidelines are required to adapt to next generation 
attacks. A single security product, technology or solution alone cannot adequately protect 
an ICS.  A multi-layer strategy involving two or more overlapping security mechanisms, 
a technique known as defense-in-depth, has been recommended to minimize the impact 
of failures and cyber attacks [21].  Defense-in-depth uses multiple layers of defense and 
diverse strategies to prevent an attacker from successfully penetrating an ICS network.  
The strategies implement subsequent layers of defense to present an attacker with 
progressively more critical challenges to overcome.  While defense strategies can 
minimize exposure to cyber attacks, systems must also be able to resolve conflicting data 
if a cyber attack bypasses existing defenses.   
2.4.1 Current Defense Strategies 
Government organizations and standards bodies recommend defense-in-depth as 
the primary strategy for achieving information assurance in computer networks and ICS 
communications [16] [17] [18].  Multiple layers of defense can be established to detect 
and mitigate many security issues.  Several strategies are recommended for Internet 
facing control systems [40] but can also be applied to non Internet facing networks. 
32 
 
Dividing control system functions into zones create clear boundaries to assist in 
effectively applying the appropriate level of defense.  
Given that adversaries can attack a target from multiple points using either 
internal or external access, organizations deploy protection mechanisms at multiple 
locations to resist all classes of attacks.  [18]. Focus areas generally include the network 
and infrastructure perimeter, enclave boundaries, and trusted communication paths.   
Physical or virtual boundaries can be established based on functional responsibilities and 
may include an external zone, corporate zone, data zone, control zone, and safety zone 
and may consist of a variety of security mechanisms [16].   
 
Figure 9: ICS Zones and Security Mechanisms [16]. 
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Figure 9 depicts typical security zones and associated security devices that 
provide several layers of defense.  Several components can be integrated together to 
create a solid defense-in-depth foundation.  The core elements are described below.  
 Network segmentation is used to create demilitarized zones (DMZs).  This can be 
accomplished with multiple routers and firewalls to provide granularity in 
defining access rights and privileges for separate functions.  Network 
segmentation could be successful by preventing malware from spreading across 
the network and performing actions such as port scans. 
 Firewalls are implemented at different networking layers to filter unwanted 
traffic.  Many firewall options exist such as packet filter firewalls, proxy gateway 
firewalls, host based firewalls, or field-level firewalls that may be appropriate.  
Solutions vary depending on the control architecture.   
 Passive intrusion detection systems (IDS), active intrusion prevention systems 
(IPS), or anti-virus protection based on known signatures, are used to monitor and 
sometimes take action on network activity that is unusual or unauthorized.  
Passive detection systems are generally used since availability is important in ICS 
applications.  However, certain activity and abnormal traffic can trigger active 
responses.  Like a firewall, an IDS can be placed at ingress and egress points in 
the architecture or at the critical connectivity points such as security zones. 
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 Connections to the SCADA systems should be encrypted using appropriate VPN 
software.   
 Policies and procedures define guidelines for training personnel, patching 
vulnerable components, analyzing event logs, responding to security incidents, 
and mitigating risk.  A well-defined and properly executed plan is critical to the 
success of the defensive strategy.  Security Incident Event Management (SIEM) 
technologies can collect, aggregate, and display log information for various events 
and provide insight for effective incident response, forensic activities, and for 
mitigation of risk. 
 
Several security mechanisms are critical to defense-in-depth.  Many defensive 
components are common in traditional information technology deployments; however, in 
ICS it is important to adapt firewall rule sets, IDS attack signatures, and audit log 
software appropriately to protect data and communications.  These defenses can improve 
security at several layers and assist in providing a secure network against indiscriminate 
attacks. 
2.4.2 Limitations of Defense-in-Depth Strategies 
Many security solutions support defense-in-depth strategies.  Network architects 
and administrators implement multiple security zones, firewalls on the perimeters, 
intrusion detection systems, and other security mechanisms to prevent attackers from 
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penetrating ICS networks.  The degrees of protection can be limited by deployed 
technologies and ICS configuration requirements.  Implementations vary by industry and 
are sometimes constrained by limited resources.  While defense-in-depth techniques are 
prescribed, specific implementations do not always conform to the defined model.  A 
network administrator or engineer for an ICS may interpret and implement defense-in-
depth principles differently due to the uniqueness of an underlying ICS.  Figure 10 was 
created to demonstrate a realistic configuration of an oil pipeline company [38] with 
defense-in-depth techniques applied.   
 
Figure 10: Notional SCADA Network Diagram. 
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The example from Figure 10 closely mirrors the earlier oil pipeline example from 
Bellingham.  In that example, a bridge device may have offered some protection and 
isolation against a casual intruder.  However, this single, limited defense was not 
sufficient nor was it equivalent to a full-featured intrusion detection system or firewall 
that is common in networks that implement defense-in-depth principles.  No additional 
physical or virtual security mechanisms were in place to prevent a cyber attack from 
occurring [2].  Regardless, recommended defense-in-depth techniques would not have 
prevented the incident from occurring. 
While the depicted layers of defense, in Figure 10, can stop many indiscriminate 
attacks, it may only delay a motivated adversary.   Many vulnerabilities remain even with 
best practices applied.  An adversary may attempt to exploit witting or unwitting insiders 
with USB drives, supply chain CDs or DVDs, or exploit firmware upgrades.  Dial-up 
modems, external terminal connections, and other unknown connections present 
additional weaknesses and enable non-traditional access points [29].  In addition, wireless 
devices and sensors provide additional injection opportunities for an adversary.  There 
are many avenues that a motivated adversary can explore.  Even with defense-in-depth 
security measures in place, ICS are still susceptible to sophisticated cyber attacks or 
failures.  As a result, additional integrity evaluation methods are necessary to supplement 
existing recommended defense-in-depth practices. 
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A targeted attack can defeat traditional intrusion detection and related layered 
defensive technologies [21].  Indeed, sophisticated, targeted malware generally presents 
unprecedented technical ingenuity and complexity and is difficult for traditional security 
devices to detect or thwart.  Many existing solutions are reactive and require known 
signatures or predetermined behavior pattern for accurate attack detection.  For example, 
an IDS can detect a wide range of attacks based on existing attack signatures, network 
traffic patterns, filenames, or file hashes.  However, the signatures required to monitor for 
malicious traffic in many control networks are not adequate [16].  Signature databases 
contain millions of signatures and most antivirus software solutions fail to detect between 
40% and 90% of novel malware less than two weeks old [6].   
Stuxnet demonstrated an ability to circumvent defense-in-depth strategies.  The 
virus, as described in Section 2.3.3, is a prime example of sophisticated, targeted malware 
that bypassed traditional security defenses and used USB thumb drives to spread and 
bypass network perimeters. The targeted Stuxnet attack, using nontraditional access, is 
depicted in Figure 11.  The malware traversed the network and moved between systems 





Figure 11: Targeted Stuxnet Attack. 
 
Stuxnet highlights the nontraditional inputs (e.g., USB drive) that can be exploited 
by attackers using cyber methods.  Unlike traditional cyber attacks, Stuxnet did not enter 
the network through the Internet via a compromised firewall or other ingress point.  Non-
traditional devices such as portable hard drives, personal laptops, music players, and cell 
phones can be extremely difficult to control and can allow a system to become infected 
with targeted malware bridging air-gapped networks.  There are legitimate uses for these 
access points (e.g., applying system patches and updating software).  As such, 
constraining the attack surface is nontrivial.  In addition, new attack surfaces are 
introduced during system upgrades and architecture enhancements. Many of these factors 
circumvent defense-in-depth protection mechanisms. 
In the Maroochy Shire incident discussed previously, an employee used 
authorized credentials to launch a wireless attack on a sewage facility [37]. Security 
controls, including SSH and VPN, for remote network connectivity can enable a secure 
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user session.  However, a secure connection does not prevent legitimate targeted attacks.  
Additional network segmentation and firewalls, if implemented, would not have been 
sufficient to prevent the aforementioned attack. This is due to the trusted connections 
once access is granted to the network.  An attacker can misuse trust relationships to 
launch an attack. Lack of detection mechanisms in ICS enables integrity attacks to be 
successful.  Indeed, these two examples highlight scenarios where traditional defense 
strategies were not successful in preventing infection and significant system failures.  The 
approach to be exploited in this dissertation aims to use physical device states besides 
trust relationships to improve robustness.    
Attackers that create targeted malware and tailored attacks require deep insight 
and insider knowledge about the target environment to achieve desired goals.  This 
information can be gathered using various methods, including spear phishing to target an 
employee and compromise a legitimate account on the network.  Additionally, a manager 
or remote operator may use virtual private network (VPN) access to perform maintenance 
or operational updates. Because these access points are considered trusted, they are not 
protected by the traditional defense-in-depth security mechanisms [21].  Compromise of 
any access point, such as a VPN, enables the attacker to become a trusted agent on the 
system and ultimately circumvents most defense-in-depth detection mechanisms.All the 
previously discussed attacks have one thing in common – they were not prevented, 
detected, or mitigated by defense-in-depth strategies.  Previous examples demonstrated 
sophisticated attacks, intentional manipulation, and unintentional system manipulation 
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that generated integrity errors in the system.  In all cases, defense-in-depth was 
insufficient in protecting the attacked network.  As a result, additional methods are 
needed to detect inconsistent and conflicting data in the network and provide an overall 
holistic view of the system.  
2.4.3 Byzantine Generals Problem (BGP) 
The Byzantine Generals Problem (BGP) was originally introduced as an abstract 
problem for understanding the reliability of computer systems and failures stemming 
from conflicting information [41].  The BGP is described in the context of malicious 
actors who modify messages to create discontinuity and conflict.  In the original problem, 
Byzantine generals communicate with one another by messenger and must decide on a 
common course of action, attack or retreat, to reach “distributed consensus”.  This 
message can be compromised at the originating point or while in transit from sender to 
receiver.  A common plan of action guarantees that a small number of traitors cannot 
negatively impact the system by enforcing a bad plan.  Each receiver must gather and 
compare orders from all neighboring generals before making a final decision to attack or 
retreat [41]. 
The original BGP authors [41] evaluate solutions consisting of traditional oral 
messages and signed messages.  Each solution assumes different requirements, features, 
and constraints when evaluating the overall reliability of the system.  Traditional oral 
messages correspond to the type of messages computers normally send to one another.  In 
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the context of ICS, traditional messages correlate to the messages passed from field 
devices to the control layer.   
2.4.3.1 Traditional BGP Messages 
If generals can send only oral messages, then valid solutions require more than 
two-thirds of the generals to be loyal.  A valid solution enables generals to reach 
consensus, or an agreed upon decision, that cannot be negatively influenced by a limited 
number of traitors.  For example, with only three generals, no solution can work in the 
presence of a single traitor.  Specifically, Lamport et al prove that consensus can be 
reached when there are at least 3m+1 generals, in the presence of at most m traitors [41].  
More generally, with 3m+1 total nodes, at most m nodes can suffer from Byzantine faults.  
That is, for m=1, only one of the four nodes can be malicious for the BGP solution to be 
valid.  In this case, a Byzantine fault corresponds to a node with an integrity issue. 
  
 




A traditional BGP scenario in which Lieutenant 3 (L3) is identified as a traitor, is 
shown in Figure 12.  In this scenario, the commander (C1) sends consistent values 
(message v) to each lieutenant (L1, L2, L3).  L2 receives conflicting data from the 
commander and other lieutenants (C1, L1, and L3).  Since L2 is a decision authority, the 
values of C1, L1 and L3 are evaluated.  L2 identifies the inconsistency and the consensus 
action by using a majority function that considers three inputs {v, v, x} which correspond 
to {attack, attack, retreat}.  In this scenario, the majority function returns v, representing 
attack.  The majority function is the basis for conflict resolution in BGP [41].     
2.4.4 Byzantine Faults and Solutions 
Byzantine fault tolerance is a sub-field of fault tolerance research inspired by the 
Byzantine Generals Problem.  The objective is to be able to defend against Byzantine 
failures, in which components of a system stop working or act in arbitrary ways 
processing requests incorrectly, corrupting local state, and/or producing incorrect or 
inconsistent outputs [42].  The following examples highlight areas where Byzantine faults 
have been recognized, evaluated, and mitigated.  A number of applications are provided 
with remedies and solutions for addressing the fault conditions that are applicable to the 
original BGP model. 
An early application of Byzantine faults was motivated by malicious attacks and 
software errors which caused faulty nodes to exhibit arbitrary behavior [43].  Castro and 
Liskov presented an algorithm for state machine replication that tolerated Byzantine 
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faults.  In this application, a Byzantine-Fault-tolerant Files system was implemented to 
demonstrate an ability to maintain operations in a hostile environment [43].  Replicated 
services provided redundancy to enable detection of malicious activity. 
 
Figure 13: Sample Byzantine Fault Architectural Solution [44]. 
  
NASA provided a conceptual design for a Reliable Optical Bus (ROBUS).  The 
Scalable Processor-Independent Design for Electromagnetic Resilience (SPIDER) is a 
fault-tolerant architecture consisting of a collection of simple processing elements [44].  
Interactive consistency conditions similar to the BGP are provided to demonstrate 
agreement and validity properties of the architecture.  Both of these properties are 
guaranteed for Byzantine faults.  ROBUS uses internal redundancy to ensure all 




 Multi-agent networks, consisting of a set of nodes equipped with some means of 
sensing or communicating with computation resources, have been used to evaluate 
Byzantine faults [45].  A solution to detect and resolve Byzantine faults is provided and 
consists of many agents monitoring the operations of multiple nodes.  Replication of 
agents allows monitoring of overlapping nodes to enable consistency checks.  Faults are 
detected using only local information.  When Byzantine faults are discovered, malicious 
node locations are shared with other agents.  This provides all agents with full knowledge 
of the network.  [45] 
Critical infrastructure sectors have started to acknowledge the concept of 
Byzantine failures and faults.  In these works, the authors discuss intrusion-tolerant 
Crutial Information Switch (CIS) design that offers application-level policy enforcement 
and a rich access control model to detect and minimize impact of successful intrusions 
[46] [47].  Like previous fault-tolerant architectures, CIS uses replicated systems to 
correlate system status to extract correct information and alleviate a single malicious 
system.  Figure 14 depicts the CIS design that mitigates intrusions and adds fault-




Figure 14: Intrusion and Fault Tolerant CIS Design [47]. 
 
Previous research has not attempted to refine or extend the BGP or specifically 
evaluate Byzantine faults in ICS using ground truth, inference, and physical properties of 
interdependent network.  Instead, past approaches rely on redundancy, which may not be 
available in ICS.  BICS seeks to maximize the natural properties of the ICS environment 
to infer an overall system state when resolving conflicting data. 
2.5 Modeling and Network Interdependency 
Fault diagnosis approaches broadly fall into two categories: (1) model-based 
diagnosis that use the design description of a system (e.g. digital circuit) to account for 
faults as deviations from the predictions, and (2) fault-model-based-diagnosis that uses 
46 
 
fault-symptom (cause-effect) knowledge (e.g. medical diagnosis) to explain symptoms in 
terms of faults, or disambiguate among faults by predicting and making additional 
observations. 
Understanding interdependencies between nodes in a system is critical.  Model-
based diagnosis provides one mechanism for evaluating internal system behaviors.  In 
addition, the dependencies can be evaluated using graph-based models including Petri 
nets and Bayesian Belief Networks.  Previous research has focused on connectivity of 
ICS components, data dependency, and dependent networks.  Graph-based models 
provide a formal mechanism for describing the flow of information in addition to detailed 
relationships.  Examples of models and interdependencies are presented in this section.  
These properties will be leveraged in the development of an integrity evaluation 
framework as discussed in Chapter III.   
2.5.1 Model-based Diagnosis 
Model-based diagnosis, or model-based reasoning, refers to an inference method 
used in systems based on a model of the physical world [48] [49].  Research in this 
domain has resulted in publications [48] discussing the role of physics in dependent 
systems [50], diagnosis of multiple faults [51], failures using knowledge of component 
states [52], and modeling and fault diagnosis of dynamic processes [53]. 
Early frameworks model behaviors of individual components.  Specifically, the 
behavior of a device is determined based on the generic behavior of its components [50].  
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This is accomplished by identifying the core knowledge, provided by physics, which 
underlies the physical system of dependent components.  Causality is generated from the 
behavior of a device as a result of interactions from a set of component devices.  The 
information-passing interactions of the individual components are the cause-effect 
interactions between the components [50].  This relationship can be correlated to a set of 
dependent nodes in an ICS.  As an example, when a valve on a pipeline is opened, the 
flow rate downstream of the valve should change.  The values of these sensors can be 
correlated as a result of the cause-effect relationship.  The physical ground truth, 
provided by physics, is constant between dependent components.  In this system, device 
behavior arises out of time-ordered, cause-effect interactions between neighboring 
components [50]. 
Additional frameworks extend single-fault scenarios to diagnose multiple faults 
[51].   Unlike previous research that explained symptoms resulting from a single faulty 
component, multiple-fault diagnostic frameworks provide a method to tolerate multiple 
faults in a single system.  The author implements an algorithm to recognize faults in 
circuit designs that are based on probabilistic information [51].  Probabilities of 
component failures are derived over time and are used to identify faulty components 
when conflicts arise.  The approach used for the framework is interactive in that 
observations are used to refine hypotheses, and the new knowledge is used to guide 
further observations [51].  
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Another extension of model-based diagnosis detects failures using knowledge of 
component states [52].  This research implements a new algorithm to extend DeKleer and 
Williams’ work [51] by identifying failures by pruning suspects using knowledge about 
the behavior of the components.  The algorithm is used to diagnose failures in hardware 
containing both single and multiple failures and requires a model of the structure and 
function of the physical system and to prune and identify faulty nodes [52].  In the 
process, suspect components are pruned and the resulting set is evaluated for failures.  If 
the system is free from faults, the pruned nodes were responsible for the conflict.  If the 
pruned nodes did not contribute to the faults, they are returned to the set and additional 
nodes are pruned and evaluated.  This method is used to diagnose faulty components. 
The proposal for improving the robustness of ICS uses the knowledge of the 
physical system being monitored by the sensors to determine the consistency among 
values reported by PLCs, which may be malicious. 
2.5.2 Petri Nets  
Petri nets are graph-based tools that model distributed systems [54].  They offer a 
formal process for modeling interdependencies and flow in networks.  There are many 
mathematical properties of Petri nets that supplement the modeling power.  In some 
cases, Petri nets are used to model and document a system.  In other scenarios, Petri nets 
are implemented to demonstrate and prove mathematical properties such as Reachability, 
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Liveness, and Boundness [54].  For example, the reachability property may be explored 
for ICS to find and model erroneous states. 
Petri nets have many different uses and have been well-studied [55] [56]. General 
application areas of Petri nets exist in software design, workflow management, process 
modeling, data analysis, concurrent programming, reliability engineering, diagnosis, 
discrete process control, simulation, and KPN modeling [54].  They provide a balance 
between modeling power and analyzability which will become evident in the following 
use cases. 
 




Attacks against critical infrastructure components are often modeled with Petri 
nets.  Figure 15 depicts a model of a cyber-physical attack against a smart meter using 
Petri nets.  Cyber and physical actions are represented separately although the distinction 
is irrelevant to the Petri net.  The model shows an example of sequential actions towards 
ultimately obtaining cryptographic keys stored in the firmware of a smart meter (P6) [55]. 
An attacker may buy (T1) or steal (T2) a smart meter leading to an acquisition state (P1).  
The physical meter could be broken (T4) to expose the internal circuitry (P3).  The 
attacker could access (T6) the internal firmware from the device (P5).  If the firmware is 
encrypted, it could be cracked (T8) to obtain the stored crypto graphic keys (P6).  This is 
one example of a Petri net developed to understand critical infrastructure components 
[55]. 
Additional critical infrastructure interdependencies have also been modeled and 
analyzed using Petri nets. Interdependencies between electric power distribution systems, 
oil and natural gas production facilities, transportation (pipelines) of these products, 
water supplies, and communications are modeled and each component is analyzed to 
identify vulnerabilities [56]. A disruption in the process of any entity, such as electric 
power, creates an effect on all dependent processes such as water, oil and natural gas 
causing delays or stoppages in production.  Relationships between components are 
represented by matrices and the interactions are captured to enable further analysis and 
activities such as production recovery strategies. 
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Interdependencies between computer communication systems and the physical 
infrastructure are becoming more complex as information technologies are further 
integrated into devices and networks.  Petri Nets have also been used to model and 
perform vulnerability assessments of cyber security for SCADA systems [57].  Access 
points, scenarios, and system properties are modeled and evaluated when malicious data 
is able to bypass primary security mechanisms SCADA networks.  Petri net transitions 
are evaluated using historical data and system vulnerability status is evaluated to 
understand attack possibilities.  Models based on past behaviors are important; however, 
a sophisticated attack against ICS may compromise a component without a history of 
failures.  As a result, additional analysis of sensor values is necessary to detect 
inconsistencies and discern system state regardless of past system behavior. 
2.5.3 Bayesian Belief Networks 
Bayesian networks, sometimes referred to as belief networks, are employed to 
model the cause and effect relationship between nodes in a network [58].  They rely on 
conditional dependencies between variables and provide beliefs about an event given 
information about other dependent events.  These networks are represented by qualitative 
and quantitative components [58] [59].  The qualitative component is composed of a 
directed acyclic graph that uses nodes to represent variables and arcs to represent the 
causal, influential relationships, or dependencies between the variables.  The quantitative 
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component consists of probability tables that describe how variables influence other 
variables.  A sample Bayesian Network is depicted in Figure 16. 
 
Figure 16: Simple Bayesian Network [60]. 
 
This example depicts the causal relationship between the Modbus slave, Modbus 
Master, Historian Database, and the HMI server, of which represent stochastic variables.  
It shows the interrelationship between the services, and their effects on one another.  Arcs 
represent the dependencies, or direct causal influences, between the services.  The overall 
system status is directly influenced by the HMI Server and the OPC Server.  This system 
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calculates the probabilities of the system state being in one of the three possible states: 
normal, degraded and unavailable.  The overall state representing the system survivability 
is derived from the probabilities of the degraded and normal states [60]. 
Additional applications of Bayesian networks in ICS model interdependencies 
between components to evaluate risk to cyber attacks, including the threat, 
vulnerabilities, and impact [61].  This is one method for not only quantifying risk, but 
also identifying the inter-connectivity in nodes within a network. Queiroz et al [60] use 
the predictive aspect of Bayesian networks to understand how a SCADA system will 
perform based on past behaviors.  Concepts of Bayesian networks are further extended to 
create Dynamic Bayesian Networks [62].  This model captures critical infrastructure 
interdependencies and presents three types of analysis including a reliability study, 
adverse event propagation study, and failure identification analysis.  Additional 
interdependencies in critical infrastructures are modeled in [63] and discuss cascading 
failures that can result between power plants, substations, fuel supplies, treatment plants, 
and pumping stations.  Bayesian Belief Networks map direct dependences and indirect 
dependencies using a causal graph structure and conditional probability tables are 
implemented as the basis for a decision support system. 
There are many benefits of Bayesian networks [59].  They provide a mechanism 
to model causal factors within a system.  Interdependent nodes can generate inference 
which enables reasoning with cause and effect relationships.  This is an important 
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concept in control systems since activity of many components are often tied together.  
Bayesian networks enable prediction modeling with incomplete or unknown data.  If data 
is missing from a system, analysis from a Bayesian network may provide sufficient detail 
to understand operations.  Finally, Bayesian network can combine physical relationships, 
engineering knowledge and statistical data in the same probabilistic models [59].  These 
elements are very relevant in the ICS domain which will be discussed in later chapters.  
These elements are not currently evaluated in real-time nor are they considered at a 
holistic level.  The approach offered in this research will leverage properties from 
Bayesian and other model-based networks, as they apply to ICS, to determine an overall 
system consistency state to enable detection of malicious components. 
2.6 Summary 
Operators of ICS make critical decisions based on sensor measurements that do 
not communicate.  If the integrity of remote sensor data is compromised, operators may 
make decisions that unintentionally compromise the state of the system which could lead 
to personal or environmental disaster as demonstrated in earlier case studies.  Integrity of 
the system can also be manipulated through cyber attacks and can result in a system that 
produces conflicting data.  Popular defense-in-depth strategies were explored in detail.  
Attacks that target critical components were able to bypass traditional security measures 
to produce a system of conflicting responses. 
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ICS were not originally designed with security in mind.  System designs and 
implementations existed before the Internet, and system components and communications 
were often difficult to understand for external observers.  Many ICS today are connected 
to the Internet, security researchers are learning about new vulnerabilities, and attackers 
are seeking to effect ICS operations remotely and surreptitiously.  With the changing 
landscape, ICS networks still do not contain sufficient security controls.  Applying 
recommended defense-in-depth strategies will provide some protection against known 
attacks.   
A decision method must be in place to fill the remaining security gap that is not 
addressed by traditional defense strategies including trusted insider manipulation and 
nontraditional attack vectors.  Manipulation of data integrity can be detected with 
alternate means.  The BGP is one well-known solution that attempts to resolve conflicting 
data stemming from Byzantine faults.  The BGP model contains a design that resembles 
ICS; however, it is not directly applicable to ICS in its original form.  This research 
addresses this limitation and provides a framework to detect integrity errors in ICS. 
Dependencies exist in ICS that can be leveraged to detect malicious nodes.  
Specifically, the BGP is based on voting among homogeneous nodes to reach a 
distributed consensus in the presence of malicious nodes, while we need an approach that 
uses system design knowledge to determine malicious nodes or faults.  Traditional faults 
have been mitigated by resilient architectures; however, Byzantine faults and malicious 
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nodes that create conflicting data in ICS are not properly remedied.  Frameworks 
leveraging model-base diagnosis, Petri nets, and Bayesian networks have started to 
explore ICS networks to demonstrate that changes in the state of ICS components impact 
the state of additional dependent components.   
Our work leverages the relationships defined by previous approaches and uses 
ground truth in an integrity evaluation algorithm.  In Chapter III, the physical ground 
truth is used in an inference model to identify consistency between ICS devices.  If an 
integrity attack occurs in an ICS, from Byzantine faults, our framework can detect the 
inconsistencies by correlating the values of interdependent nodes.  Correlating system 
states in ICS, for integrity evaluation, is not currently done at a system level.  Prior to this 
research, aspects from the fault-diagnosis approaches have not been combined to 
uniquely define a framework to identify integrity attacks in ICS. 
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III. BYZANTINE INDUSTRIAL CONTROL SYSTEM (BICS) DESIGN 
This chapter addresses the limitations of existing research and security models.  A 
new algorithm, Byzantine Industrial Control System (BICS), is derived to provide 
detection capability for integrity attacks in a hostile ICS environment.  Details of BICS 
are provided and specific examples demonstrate its utility.  This chapter concludes by 
summarizing the framework and key contributions. 
3.1 Background 
The Byzantine Generals Problem (BGP) describes communication between 
commanders and lieutenants. The BICS algorithm extends these communication 
principles to demonstrate a unique application in the ICS environment that has never 
been applied previously. Instead of generals passing messages in the BGP, field devices 
pass messages to a control layer.  Each field device collects state values from sensors and 
reports values to the control layer. The decision authority at the control layer executes an 
algorithm by comparing device layer inputs. The BICS algorithm identifies malicious 
nodes and presents the current state of the system to enable an operator to make an 
informed decision when receiving data from conflicting nodes. This may prompt 
operators to modify system parameters for better performance or to restore stability of the 
system when it becomes unstable due to integrity issues.  In summary, BICS enables 
detection and visualization of integrity attacks on ICS. 
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Contributing node is introduced as a node that produces a state value to pass 
directly to other available nodes.  BICS considers all field layer devices as contributing 
nodes.  In the context of the BGP, all nodes are contributing nodes including the lead 
commander and the lieutenants.  The concept of a decision authority is introduced as a 
node that evaluates inputs and decides on the state of the system.   In the basic algorithm, 
BICS considers only a single decision authority.  All nodes, with the exception of the 
lead commander in the BGP, are considered decision authorities. 
3.2 Design 
The BICS algorithm is designed to operate in the control layer of an ICS.  In an 
ICS, all nodes are generally known and trusted; however, they may become compromised 
and the integrity of the data may be manipulated.  Figure 17 shows the major components 
of an ICS which BICS leverages to identify integrity errors.  The goal of BICS is to 
ensure: 
 All uncompromised field devices produce and send consistent state values that 
reflect a stable system. 
 A small number of compromised field devices cannot trick the decision 





Figure 17: Basic ICS. 
 
3.2.1 Node Roles 
Nodes may perform multiple roles simultaneously.  In this framework, the 
following roles are defined: 
 Decision Component Node – A control layer node.  There is a single decision 
component node, also known as a decision authority, which receives state 
values from the field device nodes and executes the BICS algorithm to 
identify inconsistencies. 
 PLC Node – A field layer node.  There are multiple PLC nodes which send 




 Sensor/Actuator Node – A physical layer node.  There are multiple sensors 
and actuators for each PLC node.  In the context of the BICS algorithm, the 
physical layer node has been abstracted. 
3.2.2 Node Formalization 
An ICS can be thought of as being built from a collection of basic graphs where N 
is a set of ICS nodes, d is a distinguished node and NC is a set of contributing nodes.  A 
basic graph can be modeled as, GICS = (N, E, d) consisting of a set of nodes N = NC U 
{d} and a set of links E ⊆ NC x {d} where d ∈ N and d   NC.  A link (n, d) ∈ E is 
directed from a node n in NC to the node d.  ICS nodes form links between PLC and 
decision component nodes.  The following is a detailed description of the parameters 
related to nodes, links, and their relationships. 
Correspondingly, we have 
 | N | = n, the total number of nodes in the ICS 
 | NC | =  (n-1), the number of contributing PLC nodes 




Figure 18: Simplified ICS. 
 
Figure 18 shows a simple ICS with three nodes.  Direct links exist from PLC 
nodes P1 and P2 to the decision component node D1.   
3.2.3 Assumptions 
Table 2 captures assumptions made by our algorithm to identify malicious nodes 
using physical properties of sensors that do not directly communicate.  The inference 
model, based on ground truth information, is built into the BICS algorithm to enable 
evaluation of the holistic system state.  Ground truth will be discussed later in this 
section.  The foundation of BICS and corresponding scenarios are embodied in Table 2.     
Table 2: BICS Assumptions. 
A# Assumption 
A1 Physical layer devices report only truthful state values. 
A2 Field devices communicate only with control layer components and physical layer devices. 
A3 Field devices can report false information about the true physical state of physical layer devices. 
A4 A change in state, at the physical layer of one node, changes the physical state of dependent nodes. 




The assumptions provided for BICS reflect the natural environment and 
communication flow of data in an ICS.  Assumption A1 guarantees that physical layer 
devices will always perform without error and will report accurate status.  Although 
sensors are assumed to be accurate, an attacker may manipulate the data integrity of a 
field device causing it to report invalid data.  Assumption A2 is a distributed hierarchical 
requirement that forces field devices to communicate only with the control and physical 
layers.  Field devices cannot communicate with other field devices.  This is unlike the 
traditional BGP where all the lieutenants communicate with one another.  Assumption A3 
allows for the field device to misrepresent the true value of the underlying physical 
sensors.  If state values from devices are manipulated, inconsistencies and integrity issues 
will occur in the system.  Assumption A4 guarantees that a change in state in one node 
changes the physical state of dependent nodes.  When one node changes state, all 
subsequent dependent nodes will change state and report consistent readings in nominal 
circumstances.  Assumption A5 leverages the property defined in A4 and guarantees that 
the decision node has complete information about the design of the physical system and 
can determine if the successive contributing nodes are reporting consistent values or 
inconsistent values.  The last two assumptions provide ground truth and enable the 
decision node to make inferences between successive contributing nodes. 
Ground truth, in the context of BICS, is the actual known value of the physical 
sensors which cannot be manipulated.  Given one known state value, the decision 
component can infer the state of neighboring components.  Inference is enabled by 
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interdependent relationships between nodes.  When neighboring components report their 
state, the decision component can compare the reported state values with the anticipated 
state values.  Sample data, used for anticipating state values and evaluating consistency, 
are provided in Table 7.  Similar data enables the decision component to infer and 
validate the state of other dependent field devices based on the reported state of all 
dependent field devices.  If a decision authority in the control layer knows the state of a 
field device, it can infer the state of neighboring, dependent devices.  An example is 
provided in Section 3.4.  This allows the control layer to evaluate the status of a field 
device from its own declared state (which can be manipulated) and the inferred state 
based on a neighboring field devices (which cannot be manipulated).  
For correlation purposes, a simplified BGP diagram is depicted in Figure 19.   
Figure 19 shows three contributing nodes (C1, L1, and L2) and Figure 18 shows two 
contributing nodes (P1 and P2).   The solid lines in both figures represent direct links.  
Direct links represent messages passed directly from one node to another and can be 
manipulated to cause integrity issues in the system.  The simplified ICS in Figure 18 
depicts a dotted line, representing an indirect link.  The indirect link, enabled by 
Assumption A4, is not a physical link; however, it indirectly ties the two nodes together 
which enables device state inference.  The indirect link, which will be described later, 
cannot be compromised because it does not represent an actual link; instead, it is an 
artificial link that D1 infers between the nodes when comparing device states for 
consistency based on the system design description.  In both figures, the directional 
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arrows represent the flow of information.    
 
 
Figure 19: Simplified BGP. 
 
To elaborate, in Figure 19, direct links exist from C1L1, C1L2, L1L2, and 
L2L1 and therefore the contributing nodes – highlighted with bold circles – are C1, L1, 
and L2.  In the same figure, the decision authorities are L1 and L2, which evaluate the 
inbound data and produce a corresponding decision.  The simplified ICS diagram in 
Figure 18 provides direct links from P1  D1 and P2  D1. As a result there are two 
contributing nodes, P1 and P2, which pass data to the decision authority, D1.  Notice that 
D1 is not a contributing node since it does not produce a state value to send to the other 
nodes. 
As previously described, BICS contains an indirect link between field devices.  
This link is abstractly formed as a consequence of a direct relationship between inline 
field devices.  The integrity of direct links from contributing nodes is subject to 
compromise; however, the inferred link cannot be compromised, thus reducing the attack 
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surface.  The interdependency allows the higher level control layer to infer a change in 
state of a neighboring device as described in assumption A4.  Interdependency is 
available from system ground truth and the properties of dependent orderly control 
system components.   
As a practical example, consider a scenario where sensors measure water and 
weight in a bucket.  One sensor may detect water is entering the bucket while another 
sensor measures the weight of the bucket.  If existing water does not leave the bucket as 
new water enters, the weight sensor should continually report an increase.  These two 
sensors are indirectly linked and their readings should always correlate if the system is 
stable.  If these sensors do not correlate, an integrity error is present in the system.  
Inconsistency in the system can lead to an unstable or undesired state.  In the previous 
bucket example, water could overflow and cause a flood; in a more extreme ICS 
example, an oil pipeline could rupture, cause loss of life and significant cost.  The 
indirect links, together with the ground truth data, enable integrity evaluation techniques 
not available in the traditional BGP and is used as a basis for the BICS algorithm.   
In general, for ICS, state values are collected by the PLCs at the field layer.  The 
PLCs send the values to a decision component, which executes the BICS algorithm to 
identify and locate conflicting information.  Data is correlated at the decision layer to 
enable a holistic view of the system.  This requirement is also valid since all PLC values 
must be collected at a central location and compared for consistency.  BICS is 
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implemented at the decision layer to enable accurate detection without adding additional 
requirements or updates to PLCs or communication paths. 
3.2.4 Parameters 
Several parameters capture external values reported from the ICS in addition to 
internal flags.  The parameters are defined in Table 3.  Each parameter contains a value 
and description.  The values can be characters, integers or variables.  Variables represent 
arbitrary state values from PLCs that can be correlated by the decision component.  The 
variables change with each ICS example. 
Table 3: BICS Parameters. 
Parameter Values Description 
ti C or I 
L or M 
Integrity flag;  
Initially represents Consistent or Inconsistent 
Ultimately represents Loyal or Malicious node (Pi) 
si Variable Specific state value from PLC (Pi) 
l Integer Number of loyal contributing nodes (l  > m) 
m Integer Number of malicious contributing nodes (m  <  l) 
a, b, c, d, e, f Variable Arbitrary state values from PLC used for examples 
 
3.3 Algorithm Details 
To detect integrity errors in an ICS, a new BICS algorithm is executed by each 
decision authority after local state values are received from each of the associated 
contributing node (field device).  We will focus only on a single graph (from a collection 
of graphs) in what follows.  A total of (l + m) state values, one from each contributing 
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node, including l loyal nodes and m malicious nodes, are processed by BICS.  It will be 
shown that the BICS algorithm will accurately identify m malicious nodes, where m ≥1 
and n ≥ 4, as long as there are a majority of l loyal nodes (l > m).  To assist in the 
identification of loyal and malicious nodes, a function CONSISTENT is used.  The 
function evaluates the state values to identify inconsistent nodes.  After BICS identifies 
inconsistent nodes, the integrity of the entire system is evaluated by comparing the 
number of malicious nodes with the number of good nodes using a majority function.  
Each of these major elements is described in the sections that follow. 
3.3.1 Problem Statement 
Recall that ICS can be abstracted as a collection of building blocks, each block 
containing a single decision node and a number of contributing nodes reporting to the 
decision node. The problem proceeds by analyzing the reasoning supported by each 
block. 
Each contributing node receives input from a physical device that is assumed to 
be correct.  The underlying physical devices are connected in sequence, and report values 
that are assumed to be correct and always consistent with each other. However, the 
contributing nodes can be either loyal or malicious. It is assumed that physical devices 
work properly and have no faults in them, and all inconsistencies arise due to the 
presence of malicious nodes. It is also assumed that the decision node has complete 
68 
 
information about the design of the physical system. Specifically, it can determine if the 
successive contributing nodes are reporting consistent values or inconsistent values.  
The two successive contributing nodes can report consistent values if they are 
both loyal or both malicious. The two successive contributing nodes can report values 
that are inconsistent with each other if one is loyal and the other is malicious. If there is a 
sequence of three contributing nodes, and if a loyal node is positioned between two 
malicious nodes or a malicious node is positioned between two loyal nodes, then there 
will be two successive inconsistencies. 
3.3.2 Primary Functions and Algorithm 
Two primary functions are used by the BICS algorithm.  A function 
CONSISTENT is executed for each pair of contributing nodes to determine consistency, 
once state values are collected.  After all nodes are analyzed for consistency, a function 
MAJORITY is executed to determine if most nodes are consistent or inconsistent.  The 
two primary functions are described below. 
The BICS algorithm assumes a function CONSISTENT ( si , si+1 ) where si and si+1 
are state values that represent PLCs Pi and Pi+1.  The consistency checker abstracts the 
ICS component constraints that are between si and si+1.  The two input values are 
evaluated for consistency.  For this description, the application of the consistency 
function is abstracted by assumptions A4 and A5 which state that a decision node has 
complete information about the design of the physical system and it can determine if 
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successive contributing nodes are reporting consistent values or inconsistent values.  
Later, specific examples will be provided for the consistency function.  There are two 
natural choices for the value of CONSISTENT ( si , si+1 ), True or False, which reflect 
whether the state values are Consistent or Inconsistent.  If both state values are consistent 
the value “C” is assigned after returning from the function.  If both values are 
inconsistent, the value “I” is assigned after returning from the function.  If values are 
consistent, then the nodes can be consistently good or consistently bad.  If values are 
inconsistent, one of the two nodes is good and the other is bad. 
The BICS algorithm also assumes a function MAJORITY that evaluates the 
sequence of results generated by the CONSISTENT function.  The function has the 
property that if a majority of values ti equal t, then MAJORITY (t1, t2, … , tn-1) equals t.  
The input to the majority function is a sequence of values over {“C” ⋃ “I”} and as a 
result, MAJORITY (t1, t2, … , tn-1) = “C” or MAJORITY  (t1, t2, … , tn-1) = “I” based on 








Table 4: BICS Algorithm. 
Step Description 
1 Decision component collects local state values 
For each PLC Pi , 1≤ i ≤ ( l+m ), let si  be the local state value from Pi  sent to the 
decision component d. 
2 If there are at least three contributing nodes ( l+m ≥ 3 ), assume first node is consistent 
(t1  = C); Otherwise algorithm terminates due to lack of sufficient nodes. 
3 Compare all node values for consistency (relative to initial state) 
for i=1;  i<( l+m ); i++ 
 If CONSISTENT( si   si+1 ) then  (ti+1  = ti  );  
 Else   
          If  ti = I  then  ti+1 = C;  
  Else ti+1 = I 
4 Execute majority function on set of flagged states; label loyal and malicious nodes 
 
If MAJORITY (t1, t2, … , t(l+m)) = C, then first node is loyal;  
 Replace all ti = C with ti = L and replace all ti = I with ti = M. 
 
If MAJORITY (t1, t2, … , t(l+m)) = I, then first node is malicious;  
 Replace all ti = C with ti = M and replace all ti = I with ti = L. 
 
The BICS algorithm, described in Table 4, begins by acquiring local state values 
from all contributing nodes (l + m).  If there are at least 3 contributing nodes, the first 
value is labeled as Consistent; otherwise, the algorithm terminates due to lack of 
sufficient loyal nodes needed to cope with any number of malicious nodes.  The 
algorithm cannot tolerate one or more malicious nodes if there are fewer than three total 
contributing nodes.  Next, pairs of state values are evaluated for consistency in sequential 
71 
 
order.  Nodes are labeled for consistency based on their relationship to the previous node.  
Once all nodes are evaluated for consistency, a majority operation is performed.  If the 
majority of nodes are consistent, then the first node must have been loyal.  As a result, all 
consistent nodes are labeled as loyal and all inconsistent nodes are labeled as malicious.  
Alternatively, if the majority of nodes are inconsistent, the first node must have been 
malicious.  As a result, all consistent nodes are labeled as malicious and all inconsistent 
nodes are labeled as loyal.  These results hold as long as there are more loyal nodes than 
malicious nodes (l > m). 
3.3.3 Algorithm Proofs 
Claim:  Given (l + m) contributing nodes, we can use a majority function to determine 
the number of malicious contributing nodes, their identities, and correct values in case the 
values are of boolean type if and only if (l > m). 
Proof: 
 For m = 1, and for l < 2, no solution exists and the malicious node cannot be 
detected. 
 For m = 2, and for l = 3, we can verify exhaustively that the majority function, 
based on whether the successive observations are consistent or not with respect to 
the first observation, yields the conclusion about which nodes are loyal and also 
allows us to label malicious and loyal nodes correctly. 
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Table 5: Ground Truth Yields C/I. 
 
MMLLL  CCIII  I 
MLMLL  CICII  I      
MLLML  CIICI  I 
MLLLM  CIIIC  I 
LMMLL  CIICC  C 
LMLML  CICIC  C 
LMLLM  CICCI  C 
LLMLM  CCICI  C 
LLMML  CCIIC  C 
LLLMM  CCCII  C 
 
 
 For the general case, assume that we have a sequence of (l + m) values, (v1 , v2 , 
… , v(l+m) ), abstracted as boolean observations, from all the contributing nodes.  
 We can form the following (l+m) boolean values based on whether the successive 
values are consistent or inconsistent with the first value, by processing the values 
(v1 , v2 , … , v(l+m) ) in sequence as follows:  
( b(1,1)  b(1,2)  b(2,3)  …  b(l+m-1,l+m) ) 
where b(i, i+1) = C if vi v(i+1) and both i and i+1 are malicious or loyal 
                         = I otherwise 
Claim:  In the restricted situation given above, if the majority of the nodes are loyal, then 






 If the first node is loyal, then all the nodes consistent with it are labeled “C” and 
considered loyal, while all the nodes inconsistent with it are considered malicious. 
Given that the loyal nodes are a majority, a node is marked “C” if and only if it is 
loyal. 
 If the first node is malicious, then all the nodes consistent with it are labeled “C” 
and considered malicious, while all the nodes inconsistent with it are considered 
loyal. Given that the loyal nodes are a majority, a node is marked “I” if and only 
if it is loyal. 
3.3.4 BICS Algorithm – 3 Total Nodes 
In the traditional BGP, no solution exists for one malicious node with only three 
nodes in the network. The reason is that the malicious node can report different values to 
the two loyal neighbors, causing discord among the loyal neighbors. In BICS, when there 
are three total nodes (2 contributing nodes and 1 decision node), the malicious node 
cannot be detected.  This is proved in the example given in Figure 20.  In this case, m = 1 
and l = 1 which violates the requirement for l ≥ m for the BICS algorithm to accurately 




Figure 20: BICS Not Valid for Configurations with Less than 4 Nodes. 
 
Figure 20, a three-node system, highlights P1 as a malicious node and its link 
flagged with an integrity error t1=M.  Like the BGP, the basic BICS algorithm cannot 
detect the error due to the small number of nodes.  In this scenario, the decision authority 
D1 receives inputs from PLC field devices P1 and P2.  P1 reports a local state value of b 
(s1=b) and P2 reports a local state value of d (s2=d).  D1 can infer, based on P1’s reported 
state, that P2’s reported value should be c (P2s2=c); however, P2 reported its value as 
d.  Likewise, D1 can infer, based on P2’s reported state, that P1’s reported value should 
be c (P1 s2=c); however, P1 reported its value as b.  This discrepancy is caused by a 
conflict in the system between the two reporting field devices.  BICS identifies that there 
is an inconsistency in the system using the CONSISTENT function ( b ≠ d ).  However, 
D1 cannot determine which node caused the integrity error.  This proves that BICS can 
detect but cannot identify m malicious nodes when the total number of malicious nodes is 
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less than or equal to the total of loyal nodes ( m ≤ l ).  Like the traditional BGP, additional 
nodes are necessary to identify malicious nodes.       
3.3.5 BICS Algorithm – More than 3 Nodes 
The BICS algorithm provides a solution to accurately identify malicious nodes 
when there are a majority of loyal nodes ( l ≥ m ).  To demonstrate how the algorithm 
works, consider the basic case with n=4.  In this scenario, there are three contributing 
nodes and as a result the following must be true for the algorithm to hold l ≥ 2 and m ≤ 1.  
Figure 21 illustrates the Decision Authority (D1), local state values received (si), inferred 
state values (Ps), and integrity values (Ti) assigned, when P3 is flagged for an integrity 
issue.   
 
Figure 21: Basic BICS Example – P3 Contains Integrity Error. 
 
In the first step, D1 receives the following state values: s1=b from P1, s2=c from 
P2, and s3=f from P3.  In this example, b=open valve, c=high flow rate, and f=closed 
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valve.  In the second step, since there are least 3 contributing nodes (P1, P2 and P3), the 
first node is labeled consistent (t1=C).  Next, the state values from P1 and P2 are 
compared for consistency.  The CONSISTENT function determines (s1  s2) meaning an 
open valve at P1 infers a high flow rate at P2.  As a result, the integrity flag of P2 is set to 
the same value as P1 (t2 = C).  Next, the CONSISTENT function determines (s2 ≠ s3) 
meaning a high flow rate at P2 does not infer a closed valve at P3.  As a result, the 
integrity flag of P3 is set appropriately (t3 = I).  Finally, the MAJORITY function is 
executed on the set of integrity flags. The result of MAJORITY (C,C,I) = “C” meaning the 
first node was loyal.  As a result, all ti = “C” are replaced with ti = “L” and ti = “I” are 
replaced with ti = “M” identifying loyal and malicious nodes.  Thus, the closed value 
reported at P3 is incorrect. 
At this stage, using visual observations only, an ICS operator may fail to identify 
the node with the integrity issue and could act on invalid data, like the example from 
Fork Shoals.  BICS could have prevented the incident at Fork Shoals by counteracting the 
faulty alert that caused the operator to incorrectly believe a pump had started.  The state 
of the pump could have been correlated with other system parameters using BICS.  BICS 
could have automatically correlated the system information to determine if the pump 
really had started, as anticipated by the operator.  If BICS would have been implemented 
in the Fork Shoals scenario, it could have identified the integrity error based on the 
inconsistent data, regardless of the activated light on the user terminal. 
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3.3.6 Generalized BICS Example  
A basic example with only three field devices, as previously described, is trivial to verify.  
As the network grows and additional field devices are added, there is additional potential 
for malicious nodes to persist.  As a result, BICS is discussed in the context of a larger 
system with the ability to tolerate additional malicious nodes. 
 
 
            
Case 1 C/M C/M I/L I/L I/L 
Case 2 C/M I/L C/M I/L I/L 
Case 3 C/M I/L I/L C/M I/L 
Case 4 C/M I/L I/L I/L C/M 
Case 5 C/L I/M I/M C/L C/L 
Case 6 C/L I/M C/L I/M C/L 
Case 7 C/L I/M C/L C/L I/M 
Case 8 C/L C/L I/M C/L I/M 
Case 9 C/L C/L I/M I/M C/L 
Case10 C/L C/L C/L I/M I/M 
  
 
Figure 22: Extended BICS Example – Multiple Node Integrity Errors Marked. 
 
Figure 22 expands the total nodes to six (n=6).  In this larger example, there are 
five contributing nodes and as a result the following must be true for the BICS algorithm 
to accurately detect malicious nodes, l ≥ 3 and m ≤ 2.   
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The application of Figure 22 has been abstracted to minimize confusion.  For n=6, 
the valid options, as detected by BICS, are exhaustively identified.  In each case, the 
sequence of consistent and inconsistent nodes is captured.  Consistent nodes are labeled 
“C” and inconsistent nodes are labeled “I”.  Likewise, malicious nodes are labeled “M” 
and loyal nodes are labeled “L”.  When the first node is malicious, all subsequent 
malicious nodes are labeled “C” and loyal nodes are labeled “I”.  When the first node is 
loyal, all subsequent loyal nodes are labeled “C” and malicious nodes are labeled “I”.  In 
each case, the majority can be verified and results can be traced using the BICS 
algorithm, as defined in Table 4.  An example from Figure 22, Case 2, is shown in Table 
6.  The BICS algorithm is executed step by step to determine loyal and malicious nodes.  
In this example, a malicious node is one that contains an integrity error and a loyal node 









Table 6: Example Case 2 Using Figure 22. 
Step # Description 
Step 1 D1 receives state values from P1, P2, P3, P4, and P5. 
Step 2 Since there are at least 3 contributing nodes, the first node is labeled consistent  
( t1 = C ). 
Step 3 State values (s1, s2, s3, s4, s5) from paired node sequences are compared for consistency 
(P1,P2), (P2,P3), (P3,P4), (P4,P5). 
 
For i =1, CONSISTENT ( s1 , s2 ) determines  s1 ≠ s2, therefore  t2 = “I” 
For i =2, CONSISTENT ( s2 , s3 ) determines  s2 ≠ s3, therefore  t3 = “C” 
For i =3, CONSISTENT ( s3 , s4 ) determines  s3 ≠ s4, therefore  t4 = “I” 
For i =4, CONSISTENT ( s4 , s5 ) determines  s4  s5, therefore  t5 = “I” 
Step 4 The MAJORITY function evaluates the integrity flags to identify loyal and malicious 
nodes. 
 
MAJORITY (C, I, C, I, I) = “I”; therefore, the first node is malicious. 
 Replace all ti = “C” with ti = “M” and replace all ti = “I” with ti = “L” to yield: 
 t1 = “M”, t2 = “L”, t3 = “M”, t4 = “L”, t5 = “L” 
 
3.4 BICS Application  
The BICS algorithm identifies integrity problems and provides a means for 
evaluating and resolving conflicting data.  From a cyber perspective, integrity of field 
devices can be manipulated when components are networked to the Internet and non-
traditional attacks or unintentional manipulation occurs.  A field device can become 
compromised and report false data.  If this occurs, the integrity of the data becomes 
compromised.  The following example highlights a scenario when devices become 
inconsistent and identification of a malicious node is possible.   
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Figure 23 represents a notional oil pipeline and demonstrates connectivity and 
interdependency.  In this scenario, physical layer components are several miles apart and 
the components are managed by multiple PLCs which report to a single decision 
component.  The distribution of PLCs makes it difficult for an operator to manually or 
visually verify the current state of each component and the holistic system using 
traditional methods.  Nonetheless, the operator must rely on the system for situational 
awareness prior to making decisions or taking actions.  Previous examples have 
demonstrated the negative effects of conflicting data including catastrophic outcomes.  
 
Figure 23: Oil Pipeline Example Overlaid with the BICS Model. 
 
In the example depicted in Figure 23, a change in state at the physical layer of one 
node (P1) changes the physical layer and corresponding states of all subsequent nodes 
(P2 and P3).  This is an important property that allows the decision authority to infer the 
state of subsequent field devices.  The example highlights a field device that monitors 
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pressure (P1), a field device that monitors a control valve (P2), and a field device that 
monitors flow sensors (P3).  Pressure can be High (Increasing) or Low (Decreasing), 
valve position can be Open or Closed, and flow sensors can show a flow state of Yes 
(Increasing) or No (Decreasing).  Each field device can report accurate local state or 
report false local state.  Due to existing algorithm constraints, sensors are assumed to be 
fault free although PLCs may be malicious.   
Data reported by each field device is evaluated for consistency using BICS which 
allows the decision component (D1) to make decisions.  Integrity issues occur if the field 
devices (P1, P2, and P3) report conflicting state values.  Table 7 contains sensor readings 
that represent consistent and inconsistent states for a notional example based on the 
design description of the system.  The table is used for evaluating the consistency 
requirement (CONSISTENT function), enabling inference, in the BICS algorithm.   
Table 7: BICS Example – Sample Oil Pipeline Consistency Data. 
Line 
Reported Values Nodes 
Consistent? 
BICS Malicious 
Node Flagged P1 – Pressure P2 – Position P3 – Flow 
1 Low/Decrease Open Yes/Increase Yes None 
2 High/Increase Open Yes/Increase No P1 
3 Low/Decrease Open No/Decrease No P3 
4 High/Increase Open No/Decrease No P2 
5 Low/Decrease Closed No/Decrease No P1 
6 High/Increase Closed No/Decrease Yes None 
7 Low/Decrease Closed Yes/Increase No P2 




When pressure is low at the first location (P1), the valve position should be open 
at the next location (P2).  The open valve increases the flow rate at the final location (P3).  
When the pressure is high at the first location (P1), the build-up is caused by a closed 
valve in the second location (P2).  The closed valve does not allow fluid to flow at the 
final location (P3).  Inconsistent sequences of reported state values are detected by the 
BICS algorithm. Table 7 labels field devices flagged by BICS in addition to consistency 
states for all combinations of field device data.  
To demonstrate how BICS works, consider the use case of Line 2 from Table 7 
and refer to Figure 23. The BICS algorithm, as demonstrated in Table 4, follows.  In the 
first step, the decision component receives state values from the field devices (P1, P2, 
P3).  P1 reports high or increasing pressure, P2 reports the valve open and P3 reports an 
increasing flow rate.  In the second step, the first PLC value is labeled consistent (t1 = C).  
In the third step, values from P1 and P2 are compared for consistency.  The state value s1 
≠ s2 are not consistent, meaning a high pressure at P1 does not infer an open valve 
position at P2.  Since P1 and P2 are not consistent, the integrity flag of P2 is assigned 
opposite of P1 (t2 = I).  Next, values from P2 and P3 are compared for consistency.  The 
state values s2  s3 are consistent, meaning an open valve at P2 does imply a positive or 
increase in flow at P3 as reported.  The state values from P2 and P3 are consistent.  Since 
P2 and P3 are consistent, the integrity flag of t3 is copied from t2 (t3 = I).  In the final step 
of the BICS algorithm, the majority function is executed on the set of integrity values.  
The result of MAJORITY (C, I, I) = “I”; therefore, the first node must be malicious.  As a 
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result, all ti = “C” are replaced with ti = “M” and all ti = “I” are replaced with ti = “L” 
yielding the following sequence (M, L, L).  This result highlights node P1 as malicious 
and nodes P2 and P3 as loyal.  This result is reflected in Line 2 of Table 7. 
Table 7 highlights situations in which conflicting data is present.  The consistency 
value identifies conflicts between nodes and assists the BICS algorithm in labeling the 
nodes with integrity issues.  With consistencies between nodes identified, BICS can be 
successful in identifying integrity issues in the system when there more loyal than 
malicious nodes. 
3.5 Key Contributions 
The BICS algorithm is capable of identifying integrity problems and addressing 
Byzantine faults and malicious behavior in the ICS environment.  This research defines a 
new BICS algorithm that is inspired from the well-known and well-studied BGP.  Until 
now, research has not taken advantage of the unique elements and design constraints 
afforded by the ICS environment.  Features including ground truth, nodal dependency 
and indirect links in the ICS environment provide a basis for the BICS algorithm.  
Together, these elements provide a unique contribution to the field of security. 
In the ICS environment, deconfliction is necessary when processes are out of 
agreement with one another.  BICS provides the first application of some of the concepts 
from the traditional BGP to ICS using an inference model to accurately determine system 
state using devices that do not communicate with one another.  BICS is effective at 
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detecting inconsistencies.  Furthermore, BICS can always accurately identify malicious 
nodes when there are more loyal than malicious contributing nodes (l > m).   
BICS enables a decision authority to infer states of neighboring nodes.  Unlike the 
BGP problem that requires 3m+1 nodes to cope with m malicious nodes in order to seek 
distributed consensus, the BICS algorithm requires only a majority of loyal nodes to cope 
with detection of any number of fewer malicious nodes (l > m).   
In addition, BICS minimizes the number of messages needed to identify the 
integrity issues in the system.  This reduces the attack surface and provides less 
opportunity for an adversary to compromise communications.  Messages are reduced in 
ICS since nodes do not communicate directly with one another.  Reduction of messages 
necessary to detect integrity errors can reduce costs and minimize bandwidth 
requirements.  Additional details regarding message reduction are discussed in Chapter 
VI. 
In anomalous situations, automated decision components and human operators 
must make decisions to react to system integrity errors.  Implementing new 
methodologies, including BICS will assist operators and minimize the potential for 
catastrophic mistakes, such as those described in the Fork Sholes incident.  As 
demonstrated, BICS will facilitate the identification of inconsistent devices and 
ultimately identify integrity errors in the system to provide enhanced situational 




This chapter provided an overview of a new BICS algorithm, derived from 
historical security solutions, in response to existing insufficient techniques and methods 
to protect ICS and detect integrity errors in the network stemming from conflicting data.  
The next chapter will define a simulation methodology for evaluating attacks and 
protection in ICS to identify scenarios where BICS can be effective.  Subsequent chapters 
will implement the BICS algorithm and simulate it provide detailed analysis of 




IV. SIMULATION METHODOLOGY 
The previous chapter defined the BICS algorithm and characterized its utility in 
the ICS domain.  This chapter presents a methodology for modeling a cyber attack and 
protection while overlaying detection capabilities with the BICS algorithm.  BICS is 
extended and additional parameters, such as weighted trust values, are considered with 
related implications.  The goals of the methodology are to 1) develop attack scenarios in 
the ICS environment that represent malicious nodes 2) analyze efficiency, or detection 
capability, for BICS in the presence of malicious nodes under the established 
configurations and 3) understand ICS protection scenarios in the context of the BICS 
algorithm to understand tradeoffs between detection configurations to enable proper 
protection when securing ICS.   
The BICS algorithm can detect attacks from violation of integrity constraints 
when there are more loyal than malicious nodes.  The role of simulation is to determine 
what happens when there are more attackers and potentially more malicious nodes than 
loyal.  When the required BICS criteria (l > m) does not hold, it is important to see how 
the system degrades in its response to attacks.  This methodology will later define and 
then evaluate attack and protection scenarios within ICS networks while overlaying the 
BICS algorithm. 
The following sections detail the simulation environment and architecture 
components.  Section 1 describes the methodology used, details of the system under test, 
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parameters and factors for evaluation, and the specific equipment used to execute 
experiments.  Section 2 describes the model’s performance metrics.  The chapter 
concludes with a summary in Section 3. 
4.1 Methodology Components 
A methodology for assessing ICS protection, while under cyber attack, is 
provided.  The methodology provides a roadmap for evaluating BICS in addition to 
describing components necessary to generate and evaluate experiments.  The reliability 
criterion is derived from variable system parameters and system design constraints.  The 
following experimental design defines parameters and factors for a variety of different 
mission scenarios to identify optimal reliability criteria. 
4.1.1 System under Test 
The system under test is an ICS. 
4.1.2 System Parameters 
Defined in Table 8, system parameters are used in the BICS algorithm and are 
modeled in the simulation environment.  Each parameter contains a data type, data value, 
and description.  A parameter is represented by a string or an integer and each parameter 
contains a specific value.  There is no practical limit, outside of computing sources, on 
the number of PLCs or Simulations that can be executed in the simulation.  Specific 




Table 8: Simulation Parameters. 
Parameter Type Values Description 
Description String Characters Description of test case 
NumPLCs Integer No limit Number of PLCs in the simulation 
NumSimulations Integer No limit Number of simulations to execute 
AttackerTargetRate Integer 0 – 100 Attack frequency (%) against PLC 
PercentOfTrustedNodes Integer 0 – 100 Percentage of trusted nodes in 
network 
ChanceTrustedNodeAttackedSuccessfully Integer 0 – 100 Percentage (likelihood) that an 
attacked node will become 
compromised 
DebugLevel Integer 0 – 3 Internal simulation administration 
CountMaliciousNodes Integer 0 Internal simulation administration 
MaliciousNodes String Characters Internal simulation administration 
 
4.1.3 Factors 
Factors are used to modify the simulation and determine which ICS nodes can be 
attacked, the degree of protection, and resulting susceptibility to attack.   BICS accuracy 
rates are captured when the factors are modified for each unique simulation.  The factors 
and levels selected for use in this study are shown in Table 9.  Factors include: 1) 
Attacker Target Rate – Rate at which a node is attacked.  For example, if value is 33%, 
every node has 1/3 chance of being attacked; 2) Percent of Trusted Nodes – Determines 
likelihood of node combating attack.  For example, a system may trust 25% of nodes due 
to limited security and protection.  On average, if attacked, 3/4 of attacked nodes will 
automatically become compromised; the other 1/4 is evaluated further; and 3) Chance 
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Trusted Node is Attacked Successfully – Reflects the possibility that a targeted and trusted 
node is attacked successfully.  In the previous example, if a trusted node is successfully 
targeted, this parameter determines the likelihood that an attack is successful.  Just 
because a node is trusted by the system or the operator, it doesn’t mean it cannot be 
attacked.  If a node has a high trust value (e.g., if it has robust security), it may be more 
likely to resist attacks.  Examples of these scenarios will be discussed in Chapter V.  
The three factors, namely Attacker Target Rate, Percent of Trusted Nodes, 
Chance Trusted Node is Attacked Successfully are independent of each other and the 
values are modified to observe the effect on performance of the BICS algorithm.  The 
discrete levels of 0, 25, 33, 50, 66, 75, 100 were chosen to bound the factors into 
common bins.  As an example, the factors and levels can reflect a mild, moderate, or rich 
attack environment.  For the Attacker Target Rate factor, a mild environment is defined 
as 0%-25% percent of nodes under attack.  Moderate environment is defined as 33%-50% 
of nodes under attack and a rich attack environment is defined as 66%-100% of nodes 
under attack.  The other two factors and corresponding levels can be combined to reflect 
attack potential, or potential vulnerability to attack, and security protection levels.   
Table 9: BICS Factors and Levels. 
Factor Level 
Attacker Target Rate 0, 25, 33, 50, 66, 75, 100 
Percent of Trusted Nodes 0, 25, 33, 50, 66, 75, 100 




4.1.4 Experimental Design 
The experimental design is balanced with replications.  This design allows 
studying the effect of each level as well as the effects of interactions between factors on 
the response variable.  Each factor combination is replicated 100 times, as determined by 
the NumSimulations variable.  The replication allows the computation of error for 
statistical analysis.  The total number of runs needed for each simulation experiment is 
343.  Table 10 reflects a representative sample of the 343unique combinations that are 
tested in simulation. 
The basic BICS algorithm is deterministic and therefore, initial simulations only 
validate the algorithm.  However, the majority of the simulation experiments explore 
additional features in ICS that are not deterministic.  For instance, the impact of attack-
ability, the number of trusted nodes, and trustworthiness of trusted nodes are all explored 
in an advanced setting to identify scenarios when the BICS algorithm can supplement 
defensive elements to achieve the best overall efficiency.   
For example, row 35 is highlighted in Table 10 and represents a configuration 
with Attacker Target Rate = 100%, Percent Of Trusted Nodes = 25%, and Chance 
Trusted Node Attacked Successfully = 50%.  In this combination, assuming there are 100 
nodes in the ICS network, all 100 nodes would be targeted with an attack.  Of the 100 
total nodes, 25 would have some protection; the remaining 75 nodes would have no 
protection and would automatically become compromised.  Of the 25 protected nodes, 
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approximately 12 or 13 would become attacked.  As a result, the total number of attacked 
nodes would be approximately 82 of the total 100 nodes.  In this notional example, 
approximately 18 nodes would survive the rich attack environment. 
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4.1.5 Simulation Environment 
The simulation was carried out on an HP EliteBook 8470p with system 
capabilities listed in Table 11. 
Table 11: Simulation Equipment. 
Component Description 
Processor 
Intel(R) Core (TM) i7-3540M CPU @ 
3.00GHz 
Memory (RAM) 8.0 GB 
Operating System 64-bit Windows 7 
Simulator OMNeT++ 4.3.1 
 
4.2 Metrics for Performance Evaluation and Analysis 
The following system metrics were chosen to evaluate the impact on network 
integrity error detection capability when BICS is implemented. 
4.2.1 Internal Simulator and BICS Values 
Internal Simulator and BICS Values are global statistics that aggregate the total 
number of integrity errors at each node for the entire scenario.  These metrics represent 
integrity errors for each node and enable the detection of discrepancies between the 
actual simulator and BICS.  The frequency of compromise for each node is limited to the 
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total number of simulations executed.  These results are used as a basis for the remaining 
metrics. 
4.2.2 Actual Errors Detected 
Actual Errors Detected is a global statistic that aggregates the total number of 
errors detected by the simulator for the entire scenario.     
4.2.3 BICS Errors Detected 
BICS Errors Detected is a global statistic that aggregates the total number of 
errors detected by BICS for the entire scenario.  It represents the detection capability of 
BICS for each experiment accounting for all simulations. 
4.2.4 Accurate BICS Detection 
Accurate BICS Detection (PercentBICSCorrect) is a global statistic that compares 
the total number of Actual Errors Detected with the BICS Errors Detected.  The result of 
this metric is an indicator that represents the percentage of time BICS accurately detects 
integrity errors.  The converse metric (PercentBICSIncorrect) is also calculated using the 
values above. 
4.3 Summary 
This chapter described the design methodology of the proposed BICS algorithm.  
It detailed the simulation environment, architecture, models, simulation equipment, and 
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V. SIMULATION EXECUTION AND RESULTS 
This chapter implements a model, based on the simulation methodology defined 
in Chapter IV, for assessing attacks and protection in ICS and the robustness of BICS 
under various realistic as well as extreme situations.  Sections 1 and 2 provide a brief 
discussion about the BICS algorithm, the value of testing, and specific simulation 
information.  Section 3 identifies essential components of the BICS algorithm, the model, 
and its integration into the simulation environment.  Section 4 discusses the specific 
experiments.  Sections 5 through 7 provide detailed results, discussion, and analysis of 
the experiments in addition to their implications.   The chapter concludes with a summary 
in Section 8. 
5.1 Background 
Unique experiments model attacks and protection in a realistic ICS network.  The 
BICS algorithm is analyzed and evaluated for the various scenarios when sufficient 
conditions are violated.  It is shown that BICS is always able to detect inconsistencies in 
the network.  Results show that BICS accurately identifies all malicious nodes if there are 
more loyal nodes than malicious nodes in the network.  The simulation highlights ICS 
protection alternatives under various network configurations where nodes are subject to 




The BICS algorithm is implemented and validated in the OMNeT++ simulation 
framework which models attacks in an ICS.  OMNeT++, hereinafter referred to as 
OMNeT, is a discrete event simulation framework focusing on computer network 
simulations.  The open source OMNeT simulation framework is similar in functionality 
to the commercial-equivalent OPNET and MATLAB [64].  Figure 24 depicts a sample 
ICS model using OMNeT.   
 
Figure 24: Sample OMNeT Model Layout of Network. 
 
Multiple simulations are provided to evaluate the BICS algorithm.  Basic 
experiments use a minimal number of nodes to validate the BICS algorithm.  The 
OMNeT GUI allows the simulation designer to view node and system status as an 
attacker attempts to compromise the integrity of the ICS during simulation.  Advanced 
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experiments configure the number of nodes, attack capability and trustworthiness of 
various nodes.  The advanced configurations consist of several hundred parameter 
combinations and leverage batch scripts for execution.  The simulation extends the basic 
BICS algorithm by modifying the factors previously described in Section 4.1.4 and  
enables more attacks than the algorithm can tolerate.  BICS is a deterministic algorithm 
with known behavior.  The simulation is necessary when sufficient conditions are not met 
as a result of various parameter combinations. 
5.3 Environment 
OMNeT has been used in numerous domains from queuing network simulations 
to wireless and ad-hoc network simulations, from business process simulation to peer-to-
peer network, optical switch and switch and storage area network simulations [65].  As a 
result, OMNeT was chosen to model ICS and evaluate the BICS algorithm.  While 
detailed design elements and component descriptions are available for OMNeT [66], this 
section highlights only the key elements necessary to setup a model and to execute a 
simulation.  The custom simulations consist of a notional ICS environment with an 




Figure 25: OMNeT Modeling and Simulation Environment for ICS. 
 
Figure 25 depicts the OMNeT interface and essential components used to build 
models.  Network modelers define the nodes in the ICS network, the messages and types 
passed among them, connections between the nodes, and configuration parameters used 
by the nodes [64].  The available node types, also referred to as sub-modules in OMNeT, 
are displayed on the right side of the figure. Each sub-module for BICS was custom-
designed.  The primary PLCDC.ned file, shown in the center window, defines the 
relationship and connection between the ICS nodes, PLCs and DC, with an attacker that 
is ready to target the network.   
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5.3.1 Simulation Components 
PLCDC.ned is the primary file that defines the ICS model. The model references 
the user-configurable parameter PLCDC.numPLCs to generate the appropriate number of 
PLCs for the simulation.  After the model is initialized, the network diagram appears, as 
shown in Figure 24.  Messages are sent from the attacker to each PLC and from each 
PLC to the decision component.  Modules exist in both NED files and C++ programming 
files.  Examples of modules include ATTACK, AttackWeight, PLC, Decision Component 
(DC), and the BICS Algorithm (BicsAlg).  Each module is called during the simulation 
and is described in detail below.  The C++ objects and support files are also shown in the 
Project Explorer window of Figure 25. 
5.3.1.1 Attacker 
The attacker represents one component in the PLCDC.ned file.  The attacker is 
composed of two major elements, the attack weight (AttackWeight) sub-module and 
generic attack sub-module (ATTACK).  Each of the attack components contains a 
corresponding programming module.  The AttackWeight sub-module assigns weighted 
trust values for each node and determines the attack-ability of each node based on the 
simulation parameters PLCDC.percentOfTrustedNodes and 
PLCDC.chanceTrustedNodeAttackedSuccessfully.  Parameters that represent percentages 
are applied to nodes using a pseudorandom number generator function.  For example, if 
percentOfTrustedNodes is 20%, then one of every five nodes will likely be trustworthy.  
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The degree to which they will be trusted is assigned by the simulation parameter 
chanceTrustedNodeAttackedSuccessfully.  For example, if 
chanceTrustedNodeAttackedSuccessfully is 50% and the trusted node is attacked, it has a 
50% chance of becoming compromised.   
The PLCs are evaluated for attack-ability (e.g. likeliness of becoming attacked 
and compromised) when the attacker (represented by the ATTACK node) attempts to 
target and affect each PLC in the simulation.  The success rate of the ATTACK node is 
defined by the simulation parameter PLCDC.attackerTargetRate.  For example, if 
attackerTargetRate is 33%, each PLC has a one in three chance of becoming attacked.  If 
the node under attack is a trusted node, then its attack-ability is further evaluated based 
on the weight value assigned by the trust parameter 
chanceTrustedNodeAttackedSuccessfully.  If the node is not attacked, the reported node 
value remains unaltered and uninfected.  If the attack is successful, the integrity of the 
node is compromised and the node reports a value that will be inconsistent with 
uncompromised node values.  
The attack-ability level for an ICS ultimately reflects the threat environment.  The 
corresponding trust (e.g. percentOfTrustedNodes and 
chanceTrustedNodeAttackedSuccessfully) reflects protection that is put in place to 
remedy the threat. This simulation identifies attack scenarios in ICS.  If high threat 




The PLC represents another component in the PLCDC.ned file and contains a 
corresponding programming module.  The role of PLC is to send messages to the DC.  
The programming module contains functions to maintain local state values and to pass 
messages from the node to the DC.  As described previously, each PLC has an abstract 
weight value which is used to potentially resist attacks.  The weight also acts as a trust 
value for the DC.  To that end, each PLC may be influenced by an attacker.  In the 
simulation, the node will turn red when it sends a message to the DC, if it is successfully 
compromised by an attacker; otherwise it will remain green. 
5.3.1.3 Decision Component 
The DC represents the last primary element in the PLCDC.ned file and also 
contains a corresponding programming module.  The DC implements the BICS algorithm 
by calling the BicsAlg module.  BicsAlg evaluates the input of each PLC to determine if 
there are inconsistencies in the reported data.  The algorithm is also able to locate the 
PLCs that are responsible for the integrity errors.  The DC implements a logging 
function, BICSLog that records data and computes statistics for all simulations.  BICSLog 
generates statistics by comparing results from the BicsAlg and the actual simulator 
values.  Statistics are saved to an output file for further analysis. 
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5.3.2 Simulation Configuration 
Modules in OMNeT can have parameters.  Parameters can be defined in the NED 
files or in the omnetpp.ini configuration file.  The OMNET implementation of BICS uses 
parameters and defines multiple configurations in the omnetpp.ini configuration file.  A 
partial configuration file, displaying sample parameters and values, for the ICS is shown 
in Figure 26.   
  
 




Parameters in the ICS model include numPLCs, numSimulations, 
attackerTargetRate, percentOfTrustedNodes, and 
chanceTrustedNodeAttackedSuccessfully. The first two parameters are integer values 
representing the desired network size and number of simulations to execute.  The last 
three parameters are integer values representing percentages of 0%, 25%, 33%, 50%, 
66%, 75%, or 100%.  Multiple combinations of parameters are tested to determine the 
configuration that enables BICS to accurately detect integrity errors in the network with 
the greatest efficiency.  Multiple configurations and successful BICS detection rates are 
explained in subsequent sections.   
5.4 Experiments 
ICS networks are modeled in OMNeT and experiments are conducted to 
demonstrate the utility of the BICS algorithm in realistic setting and to explore tradeoffs 
with protection options given a known threat environment.  343 unique scenarios were 
created in the omnetpp.ini configuration file; six sample scenarios are shown in Figure 
26.  The scenarios expand upon the representative sample shown in Table 10.  The 
unique scenarios reflect diversity in the attack, trust and protection levels and represent 
all possible combinations between the specified parameters and levels.  Each 
configuration is executed manually using the OMNeT GUI or automatically using the 
command line.  During each simulation, custom debug output is displayed in the OMNeT 
user window.  At the conclusion of each simulation, summary statistics are generated for 
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each unique scenario and categories are aggregated to reflect BICS errors detected, actual 
errors detected, and BICS accuracy rates.  Partial statistics are also displayed in the user 
window, and saved to a text file for further analysis.  Figure 27 depicts a sample user 
window with output data.  Detailed results are available in the next sections with full 
statistics and simulation available in Chapter VIII. 
 
Figure 27: Sample OMNeT User Window with Output Data. 
 
5.4.1 Basic Experiments 
The OMNeT GUI provides sufficient functionality to execute basic ICS 
experiments.  Basic experiments are necessary to validate the simulation methodology 
105 
 
and for evaluating scenarios with a small number of nodes.  However, expanded and 
advanced experiments, to be discussed later, are necessary for evaluating complex 
scenarios that are too burdensome to be done by hand.  A simple ICS network model, 
consisting of six PLCs, is constructed in OMNeT to demonstrate the correctness of the 
algorithm.  Figure 28 displays the first steps of a single simulation. 
 
Figure 28: BICS Simulation - Attack Begins. 
 
The simulation begins with an attacker sending messages to each PLC.  In this 
stage, an attacker attempts to infect each PLC device.  In the basic experiment, 
attackerTargetRate is 33% and percentOfTrustedNodes is 0%.  These parameters specify 
that each PLC has a one in three chance of becoming compromised and there are no 
trusted nodes.  The variable chanceTrustedNodeAttackedSuccessfully could have been 
specified; however, there are no trusted nodes, as defined by the previous parameter, and 
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therefore there is no additional protection from compromise.  Since there are no trusted 
nodes, all PLCs have the same equal weight values.  In this scenario, if a PLC is 
successfully targeted by the attacker, then the node will automatically become 
compromised. 
 
Figure 29: BICS Simulation - Sample Nodes Attacked. 
 
Figure 29 depicts the next stage in the simulation.  In the second stage, each PLC 
sends its current state value to the DC.  PLCs successfully compromised by the attacker 
are changed to red by the simulator; otherwise they remain green.  To this point, only 
PLC[3] has turned red as shown in Figure 29, meaning it was successfully compromised 
by the attacker.  As mentioned earlier, the simulation considers a number of scenarios to 





Figure 30: BICS Simulation - Node Values Submitted. 
 
Figure 30 depicts the stage when the DC initiates the BICS algorithm.  The figure 
shows two nodes that were successfully targeted and compromised by the attacker.  At 
this stage, the BICSs algorithm has received state values from every PLC.     
The BICS algorithm evaluates the PLC state values to identify nodes with 
integrity errors.  First, the integrity flag of PLC[0] is set to consistent.  Next, each node is 
compared, in sequence, to next node.  Consistent and inconsistent nodes, as defined 
previously in Table 4, are identified.  Finally, the majority algorithm is used to identify 
and label loyal and malicious nodes.  The system state produced by BICS and displayed 
in the user window is visually compared with the colored nodes in the GUI and the 
results from the output file to ensure BICS accurately detects the proper nodes with 
integrity errors.   
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In the previous example, BICS accurately flagged nodes PLC[3] and PLC[5] with 
integrity errors.  Conflicts between BICS and the simulator result when there are more 
malicious nodes than loyal nodes.  This implies that the attack-ability of the ICS nodes 
was too high for the corresponding protection (e.g. low percentOfTrustedNodes and/or 
high chanceTrustedNodeAttackedSuccessfully) which ultimately did not allow the system 
to retain more loyal than malicious nodes.  These scenarios are described in detail in later 
sections. 
5.4.2 Expanded Single Experiment 
The OMNeT GUI provides sufficient functionality to execute expanded ICS 
experiments for single and multiple simulations.  The purpose of this experiment is to 
demonstrate that the basic ICS attack scenarios, protection considerations, and the 
corollary BICS detection rates can be scaled to a much larger network by successfully 





Figure 31: BICS Simulation - Expanded Experiments Include 60 PLCs. 
 
Figure 31 shows the initial stage of an expanded simple experiment containing 
sixty PLCs.  This stage reflects the attempt of an attacker to infect each PLC device.  
Like the first basic experiment, this configuration uses the same attackerTargetRate of 
33% and percentOfTrustedNodes of 0%.   The number of PLCs in this expanded network 
(60) and the number of simulations (100) are the only differences from the first basic 
experiment.  The remaining steps of this simulation are the same as the first basic 
experiment: the PLCs change color to reflect successful compromise; each PLC passes its 
current state value to the DC; the DC initiates the BICS algorithm to detect integrity 
errors; results are displayed in the user window and saved to an output file; and finally 
results from the BICS algorithm are visible in the GUI.  In all simulations, BICS 
accurately identifies when integrity errors are present. 
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5.4.3 Advanced Experiments 
Initial experiments verified and validated ICS attack-ability and correlated BICS 
detection.  Using a vetted model, advanced experiments were designed to explore 
configurations that could extend the understanding and applicability of the BICS 
algorithm in a contested ICS environment.  To facilitate rapid testing, OMNeT provides a 
mechanism to execute many experiments with minimal user interaction.  The OMNeT 
command line environment enables the automatic execution of multiple experiments.  
Many runs allow for the complete testing of many ICS networks under a variety of 
conditions.   
In previous experiments, node weight and associated trust values were 
insignificant.  In those trials, no single node was trusted or protected more than another.  
As a result, all nodes were exposed to the same degree of attack.  In the advanced 
experiments, parameters representing attack-ability of nodes, trust of nodes, and ability to 
successfully attack trusted nodes are manipulated to provide enhanced results. 
In each trial run, attackerTargetRate, percentOfTrustedNodes, and 
chanceTrustedNodeAttackedSuccessfully are modified to test every configuration 
combination using the percentages of 0%, 25%, 33%, 50%, 66%, 75%, and 100%.  These 
parameters represent varying weights and associated trust for each node.  In some cases, 
these parameters protect nodes while other cases expose nodes to more threats.  The goal 
of the advanced experiments is to identify complex ICS attack scenarios and protection 
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considerations while evaluating the ability of BICS algorithm to accurately detect 
integrity errors. 
Using the seven percentages defined above, 343 unique trial runs were created, 
each of which executes 100 simulations using 100 PLCs.  The unique configurations 
were first created in Microsoft Excel, copied into OMNeT and reformatted to enable 
quick execution from the command line.  
Figure 26 highlights six sample runs.  Each run contains a unique name in the 
omnetpp.ini configuration file; one example is Run342.  Executing a simulation from the 
command line uses the unique name as a parameter.  To execute multiple runs in serial, a 
batch file is used.  Figure 32 shows the sample batch file.  Results from each simulation 
are written to a text file. 
 




Many interesting results were produced from the OMNeT simulations that 
modeled ICS networks using the BICS algorithm to identify integrity errors.  BICS was 
validated in initial experiments using basic configurations.   Subsequent experiments 
provided evidence of scalability.  Finally, additional experiments tested several 
configuration combinations to identify attack and defense scenarios when BICS was most 
effective in identifying nodes with integrity errors.  Details from the simulations were 
extracted from the output file to produce many graphs of interest.  The results were 
divided into two categories representing equal and differing weights.  Details of each 
category are described in subsequent sections. 
5.5.1 Equal Weights 
Integrity errors in a simulation reflect that the PLC has been successfully 
compromised by the attacker.  Accurate detection using the BICS algorithm is first 
demonstrated in the basic 6-node PLC configuration represented in Figure 24.  Later the 
BICS algorithm is shown to scale effectively with a 60-node PLC network.  This network 
is represented in Figure 31.  The results from initial equal-weight experiments show that 
the BICS algorithm is able to successfully identify inconsistencies in the network when 
an integrity error is generated by at least one PLC.  In general, when there are more loyal 
than malicious nodes, BICS is able to accurately detect and specifically locate the source 
of integrity errors among PLCs.   If the number of malicious nodes exceeds the number 
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of loyal nodes, BICS can still identify integrity errors in the system since values reported 
by sensor values will be inconsistent.  The advanced experiments, using multiple weights, 
also reflect this finding.     
5.5.2 Multiple Weights 
Once the BICS model was validated using equal weights, weighted functions 
were enabled to represent trust between PLCs and the DC and corollary protection of the 
PLCs.  This extended the utility of BICS to explore conditions in which the algorithm 
would continue to identify malicious nodes while additional protective measures were 
added to the ICS.   
In summary, BICS yielded a 0% detection rate in 20% of total trials, a 1-99% 
detection rate in 25% of trials, and a 100% detection rate in 55% of total trials.  These 
scenarios often allowed a high percentage of nodes to be targeted and attacked 
successfully although the BICS algorithm was only defined to handle situations where 





Figure 33: BICS Simulation Results - All Configurations. 
 
Figure 33 shows all 343 trials generated by configuring three primary parameters.  
The detection rate of the BICS algorithm is highlighted in blue and is sorted from 
smallest to largest.  The parameter attackerTargetRate is represented by a dotted yellow 
line, percentOfTrustedNodes is represented by a thick green line, and 
chanceTrustedNodeAttackedSuccessfully is represented by a thin gray line.  Each of the 
values range in percentages from 0% to 100% as previously described.  For example, 
point 300 shows a scenario with BICS Accuracy = 100%, Attacker Target Rate = 50%, 
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Figure 34: BICS Simulation Results – Accuracy 0%. 
 
Figure 34 shows 20% (68/343) of the total trials where BICS was not able to 
accurately detect the node responsible for the integrity errors.  While the BICS algorithm 
did not have a high success rate in these trials, it did accurately detect the inconsistencies 
in the system.  In this set of trials, it was commonly the case that it was mathematically 
impossible or improbable to yield a high success rate for the BICS algorithm.  For 
example, with attackerTargetRate greater than 60% and 
ChanceTrustedNodeAttackedSuccessfully greater than 60%, as reflected in half the trials 
shown in Figure 34, then most nodes would be targeted and successfully attacked 
regardless of whether or not protection was in place or if a small number of PLCs were 
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malicious nodes when there are more good nodes than malicious nodes; otherwise, BICS 
will only detect the inconsistency without proper identification of the malicious nodes.  In 
this set of scenarios, there were always more malicious nodes than good nodes which did 
not enable BICS to be accurate, even though inconsistencies were identified.  The results 
reflect a network with minimal protection and high susceptibility to attack.  In these 
cases, it is recommended that other mechanisms and procedures be implemented prior to 
incorporating an algorithm such as BICS. 
 
Figure 35: BICS Simulation Results – Accuracy 1-99%. 
 
Figure 35 shows 24% (85/343) of the total trials where the BICS algorithm 
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perform with 100% accuracy because the simulation was not limited to the same 
constraints of the algorithm.  As a result, it was commonly the case that it was 
mathematically impossible to yield a high success rate for the BICS algorithm.  For 
example, in cases where BICS yielded a low accuracy rate, the attacker target rate was 
high, there were a minimal number of trusted nodes, and there was a high chance that 
trusted nodes would be attacked successfully.  In these scenarios, the simulation allowed 
for a majority of nodes to be compromised whereas the BICS algorithm requires a 
majority of nodes to be loyal for accurate detection. These filtered results limit the total 
results and start to identify interesting scenarios that yield high detection rates for BICS.   
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Figure 36 shows 55% (190/343) of the total trials where the BICS algorithm 
performed with 100% accuracy.  Unlike the previous trials, all scenarios provided 
opportunity for BICS to perform with 100% accuracy.  This set of results accounts for 
scenarios where the attacker target rate was low, medium, and high.  Most scenarios 
required a minimum of ¼ trusted nodes and a combination of low and high chances for 
the trusted nodes to be attacked successfully.  These results continue to identify 
interesting scenarios that yield high detection rates for BICS. 
5.6 Discussion 
It has been shown that the BICS algorithm is effective in detecting and locating 
nodes with integrity errors in a network. The 343 unique experiments revealed parameter 
combinations that yield low, medium, and high accuracy rates for the BICS algorithm.  
The new figures enable additional opportunity to analyze the data by providing specific 
cases and identifying the parameter values to achieve desired BICS accuracy levels.  This 
information can provide practical insights to assist network designers, owners, and 
operators in developing a system, implementing security, or evaluating the reliability of a 
network. 
Figure 37 shows 29 trials where the BICS algorithm performed with accuracy 
from 70-99%.  In all 29 scenarios, the minimum attacker target rate was 50%, meaning 
each node had a 50% chance of being attacked and becoming malicious.   The same data 
shows that a minimum of 25% trusted nodes were required.  This data shows 
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combinations of parameters necessary to yield some overall level of security.  It can be 
used to identify ICS configurations that yield a high BICS detection rate.  For example, if 
a BICS detection rate of 99% is desired, then Figure 37 can be used to highlight 1 of 7 
possible configurations.  One scenario for a 99% BICS detection rate (point 23) requires 
an attacker target rate of 50%, 33% of nodes trusted, and a 33% chance that trusted nodes 
would be attacked successfully.  In 100 simulation executions, this specific scenario 
yielded an average BICS detection rate of 99%.          
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Figure 38 shows 43 trials where the BICS algorithm performed with 100% 
accuracy.  In all 43 scenarios, the minimum attacker target rate was 50%, meaning each 
node had a 50% chance of being attacked and becoming malicious.   The same data 
shows that most scenarios required a minimum of 50% of nodes to be trusted with less 
than 66% chance of trusted nodes being attacked successfully.  Like the previous 
example, this data can be used to identify ICS configurations that yield a perfect BICS 
detection rate.  One scenario for a 100% BICS detection rate (point 32) yields an attacker 
target rate of 75%, 66% of nodes trusted, and a 25% chance that trusted nodes would be 
attacked successfully.  The product of target rate, trusted nodes, and chance of attack 
must yield a majority for BICS to be 100% accurate.  Theory provides the threshold 
while the actual application trades off various parameters. 
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This dataset uses attackerTargetRate greater than 50% since the BICS algorithm 
is already able to cope with a large minority (some value less than the majority) of 
malicious nodes.  As a result, it provides the most value when comparing the number of 
assets to protect versus the amount of protection to put at each asset, given a known 
threat environment (e.g. attackerTargetRate greater than zero).  Multiple parameter 
values, like in the other examples, can be combined to achieve the same overall level of 
security.  In these scenarios, there is a 0% chance of trusted nodes being attacked, 
representing a perfect defense.  This may be attributed to elite physical security, air-
gapped network capabilities, and additional security measures which prevent all trusted 
nodes from becoming compromised.  While it could be expensive to achieve this state, it 
may be a desirable option for a system designer that chooses to secure only one-third of 
all the nodes in the network, to the maximum level, given a rich threat environment (e.g. 
66% of all nodes targeted).   
The two examples described above (Figure 37, point 23 and Figure 38, point 32) 
have different parameters, but yield similar accuracy with the BICS algorithm.  Many 
other scenarios reflect cases with a low target rate and/or a high amount of secured and 
trusted nodes.  All examples can be verified using the results displayed in previous 
figures or by referencing the sample output file from the OMNeT simulation in Chapter 
VIII.   
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Results can be tailored to meet the needs of a designer, owner, or operators of 
networks that implement the BICS algorithm.  For instance, if an interested party is able 
to accurately determine the threat level, the results can be sorted by attackerTargetRate to 
leverage configurations with high BICS accuracy.  Alternatively, if an interested party 
has resources to protect nodes, they may sort the table by percentOfTrustedNodes to 
determine how many nodes, and to what level of trust is needed to protect the network to 
get it to a state that will enable BICS to function with a high success rate.  Individuals 
responsible for designing, operating, or maintaining the network can identify situations 
where BICS achieves greatest success to maximize the security and safety of the network. 
5.7 Data Analysis 
It has been shown, using OMNeT for modeling and simulation, that BICS is 
effective in detecting and locating nodes with integrity errors in a network when there are 
more good nodes than malicious nodes. BICS was validated in initial experiments using 
basic configurations.   Subsequent experiments provided evidence of ICS scalability and 
corollary detection rates for BICS.  Many additional experiments explored several 
configuration combinations to identify scenarios when BICS was most effective in 
identifying nodes with integrity errors.  These scenarios overlaid BICS on top of ICS 
threat and protection scenarios to identify when the algorithm could be most effective. 
In all 343 trials, BICS was able to accurately identify inconsistencies in the 
system.  In 219 configurations, or 64% of the total unique scenarios, BICS performed 
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with greater than 70% accuracy and correctly detected the nodes responsible for integrity 
issues.  In 190 trials, or 55% of the total unique scenarios, BICS performed with 100% 
accuracy.  The accuracy levels for BICS are very good since scenarios often allowed a 
high percentage of nodes to be targeted and attacked successfully although the BICS 
algorithm was only defined to tolerate a network where there are more good than 
malicious nodes.  In general, BICS accurately identified all malicious nodes when the 
number of malicious nodes was less than the number of good nodes.   
The results of the modeling and simulation experiments are vital to helping 
system designers, owners, and operators understand the requirements necessary to 
accurately detect integrity errors in a network.  Results demonstrated several 
configurations that enabled the placement of trusted anchor nodes to achieve a high 
degree of accurate detection capability.  Ultimately, BICS enables asset owners to build 
smarter networks that can be adjusted to accommodate the threat environment. 
5.8 Summary 
This chapter explores BICS beyond the formal definition offered in previous 
sections to validate claims and demonstrate utility in a realistic environment by 
conducting extensive modeling and simulation.  Modeling and simulation provides a 
mechanism for stakeholders to create attack scenarios, demonstrate effects, and to 
evaluate data to assist in the understanding of protection and mitigation considerations.  
The results from these simulations can help network designers understand the number of 
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sensors necessary and the placement (e.g. on 33% of nodes) of sensors to detect and 
mitigate attacks (e.g. protection necessary) and to visualize how protection can be 
supplemented with the BICS algorithm.  Operators will have the ability to accurately 
determine if the system is in an inconsistent state in addition to which specific nodes are 
responsible for the conflicting data.  
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VI. BICS ANALYSIS 
Chapter 5 presented performance results for BICS, showing its detection 
capability in a contested ICS environment.  This chapter presents further discussion of the 
algorithm.  Section 1 describes the engineering advantages of using BICS, and Section 2 
correlates BICS to existing algorithms.  The chapter concludes with a summary in  
Section 3. 
6.1 Engineering Advantages of BICS 
BICS is designed to be an algorithm that is resistant to numerous integrity attacks.  
It uses design knowledge and integrity constraints, due to device operations and structure, 
to detect inconsistencies and from it offending nodes.  Its unique design affords many 
engineering advantages, to include: 
 A framework that effectively identifies integrity errors and locates misbehaving 
nodes or data sources in the system. 
 A framework that is resistant to network-based attack, from both external and 
internal threats, designed to affect the integrity of information. 
 A framework that is resistant to node misbehavior (intentional or not) due to the 
compromise of individual nodes. 




 A framework that minimizes bandwidth requirements (number of messages 
necessary) for accurately detecting conflicting data in a network. 
 A framework that extends detection capability to other network layers.  
6.1.1 Accurate Identification and Location of Integrity Errors 
Consistency checks in BICS make it very robust against integrity errors.  Of the 
343 trials reviewed, BICS was able to accurately identify all inconsistencies in the 
system.  In 64% of the total unique scenarios, BICS performed with greater than 70% 
accuracy and correctly detected nodes responsible for integrity issues. 
6.1.2 Network-based Attack Identification 
Data integrity is often manipulated at the network level.  Nodes in an ICS often 
share a common network for transmitting state information.  A network-based integrity 
attack can occur in several ways, one of which includes a man-in-the-middle attack.  This 
category of an attack often intercepts communications while they are in transit from a 
sender to a receiver.  An attacker may modify the intercepted data and introduce integrity 
errors into the system. 
Network-based integrity attacks are stopped by BICS because all data is checked 
for consistency with all other values in the network.  If data is manipulated in transit from 
a node to a decision component, BICS will detect an inconsistency and identify the 
source of the integrity error.  Unlike other architectures, BICS does not require redundant 
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transmissions to detect inconsistencies.  Instead, multiple state values from dependent 
devices are analyzed and correlated. 
6.1.3 Node Compromise Identification 
Data integrity is often manipulated at the node level.  A node may become 
vulnerable to attack if there is insufficient protection.  An adversary may compromise a 
node to generate integrity errors in the system.  A malicious node may report inaccurate 
data to confuse an operator or to degrade system performance.   
BICS is not vulnerable to this attack.  Like network-based attacks, node 
compromise is always detected by BICS.  BICS checks data for consistency and prevents 
an attacker from successfully compromising the integrity of the holistic system.  If there 
are conflicts in reported data, the BICS algorithm will recognize the inconsistency and 
identify the source of the integrity issue. 
6.1.4 Minimal Nodes to Detect Integrity Errors 
The BICS algorithm only requires a majority of loyal nodes to cope with a large 
minority of malicious nodes (n-1 = m + l); l > m).  The two algorithms require the same 
number of total nodes when m=1.  Table 12 shows total number of nodes necessary to 




Table 12: Total Nodes Required by BICS (l > m). 
Malicious Nodes Loyal Nodes Total Nodes 
1 2 4 
2 3 6 
3 4 8 
4 5 10 
5 … … 
6 l = n - m - 1 n = l + m + 1 
 
6.1.5 Bandwidth Improvements – Message Counts Reduced 
Minimizing the number of nodes necessary to reach consensus is the primary 
objective of the BGP problem [41]; however, an overlooked consequence of the 
algorithm is the number of messages necessary to identify the malicious components.  
BICS enables accurate detection of integrity errors with a minimal number of nodes.  
This becomes evident when results are correlated to the existing BGP solution.  
Minimizing messages reduces the attack surface and provides less opportunity for an 
adversary to compromise communications.  Messages are reduced in BICS since nodes 
do not communicate directly with one another.  The reduction in messages does not 
prevent the decision authority from resolving conflicting input.  The decision component 
can still correlate state values from the nodes to identify integrity issues while providing 
an overall system status.   
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BICS is implemented at the control layer of an ICS.  In consequence, a minimal 
number of messages are required to identify nodes with integrity errors.  The number of 
messages (gn) required to identify integrity issues among n total nodes is (n-1).   
BICS Message Count Enumeration 
 Round 1: Field devices send (n-1) messages to the decision component 




Figure 39: BICS Message Counts. 
 
Figure 39 shows the number messages sent between nodes for the first four cases of the 
BICS algorithm.  In the first and only round, the field devices (PLCs) always send one 
message to the decision component.  The number of messages exchanged between field 
devices and the decision component is represented as (n-1).  The number of messages 
will always be consistent since field devices do not communicate directly with one 
another.  As a result, the total number of messages sent using BICS in  
Figure 39 are calculated: g3=2, g4=3, g5=4, g6=5, and generally as gn=(n-1).  In addition, 
the complexity of the algorithm at the decision node is linear.  
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6.1.6 Extensible Application 
BICS was designed, implemented, and tested in an application-layer decision 
component.  Outside of the application layer, BICS can be extended for additional uses.  
At the network-layer, BICS can act as a correlation-based intrusion detection system with 
the ability to detect conflicting data by evaluating network traffic.  A collaborative 
anomaly detection and identification system, inspired by and based on BGP principles, 
does not currently exist enabling BICS to be the first.  Using BICS, data with integrity 
errors will always be flagged.  BICS implemented as a correlation-based detection system 
at the network level would enable accurate identification of integrity errors when there 
are more loyal than malicious nodes.  BICS may be further extended to a host-based 
intrusion detection system. 
6.2 Maximizing Attributes from Existing Approaches 
BICS is a unique algorithm that refines and extends the BGP, model-based 
diagnosis, Bayesian Belief Network, and principles from Petri-Nets.  These concepts are 
extended specifically to ICS using ground truth, inference, and properties of 
interdependent network.  This research maximizes the natural properties of the ICS 
environment to infer an overall system state when resolving conflicting data.  The BICS 
algorithm is a novel application that has not been discussed or considered in previous ICS 




6.2.1 Byzantine Fault Tolerance Considerations 
Byzantine faults have been well-defined and recognized in fault tolerant 
applications and are mitigated by redundant components, as discussed in Chapter II.  
BICS addresses the significance of Byzantine faults in another manner by using physical 
properties of the system to address the integrity problem, without requiring redundant 
architectures. 
6.2.2 Byzantine Generals Problem 
The Byzantines General Problem (BGP) was described in detail in Chapter 2.4.3.  
Previous sections provided a brief correlation of message traffic and bandwidth 
utilization, data flow and message direction, and data producers and consumers.  This 
section identifies additional similarities and differences in the underlying architectures.   
BGP utilizes a majority function to compare values received from all other nodes.  
BGP consensus uses a majority function only considers the binary values of attack or 
retreat.  BICS must compare many non-binary values based on system knowledge and 
design constraints.  The consistency function in BICS abstracts the value types and 
enables evaluation of node values.  BICS incorporates properties inherent to ICS and 
interdependent networks to evaluate and resolve conflicting information while providing 
a holistic view of the system. 
132 
 
6.2.3 Complementary Support Models 
Dependencies exist in ICS that can be leveraged to enhance security protection 
models.  Applications of model-based diagnosis, Petri nets and Bayesian networks 
demonstrate that component changes impact inline dependent operations.  However, 
detection mechanisms for malicious components and the correlation of system states are 
not evaluated at a system level.   
Similar evaluations focus on the past behavior of system components to determine 
dependability and reliability, but I am not aware of any existing security models for ICS 
that use the natural properties of the environment in the establishment of a supplemental 
security application.  BICS correlates data at the system level and past performance of 
network components are not considered in the integrity evaluation process.  Instead, 
BICS dynamically analyzes state values from the components and identifies 
inconsistencies in the network to provide better insight into the current overall integrity 
of the system. 
6.3 Summary 
This chapter provides an analysis of the BICS framework and its overall 
effectiveness.  The engineering advantages are discussed in detail.  Finally, the BICS 
framework is correlated to similar frameworks.  The next chapter provides a conclusion 




7.1 Summary of Research 
The goal of this research was to investigate how to detect and locate integrity 
errors, stemming from Byzantine faults or other conditions, in an ICS using properties of 
devices that do not communicate directly.  This goal was achieved and ultimately 
provided a holistic view of the system in a fashion that automatically correlated state 
values to allow operators of networks to function securely and confidently in a hostile 
environment.   
7.2 Significance of Research 
The technical contribution of this research is a new method, called Byzantine 
Industrial Control System (BICS), for detecting integrity errors and addressing Byzantine 
faults in the ICS environment.  It is a novel approach that uses physical properties to 
discern system state regardless of past system behavior.  Malicious nodes are 
dynamically identified using local state values from processes that do not communicate 
directly.   
Analysis of the results demonstrated that BICS was effective in detecting and 
locating nodes with integrity errors in a network.  Further analysis demonstrated that the 
number of messages required to evaluate holistic system state was minimal.  Simulation 
results highlighted several ICS configuration combinations, with varying degrees of 
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attacks and protection, to identify when BICS is most effective.  BICS uses design 
knowledge and integrity constraints, due to device operations and structure, to detect 
inconsistencies and from it offending nodes.   
The engineering advantages of BICS are: 
 A framework that effectively identifies integrity errors and locates misbehaving 
nodes or data sources in the system. 
 A framework that is resistant to numerous types of network-based attack from 
both external and internal threats, designed to affect the integrity of information. 
 A framework that is resistant to node misbehavior (intentional or not) due to the 
compromise of individual nodes. 
 A framework that minimizes the number of nodes necessary to detect integrity 
errors (n = l + m where l > m). 
 A framework that minimizes bandwidth requirements (number of messages 
necessary) for accurately detecting conflicting data in a network (gn= n-1). 
 A framework that extends detection capability to other network layers. 
Security research in ICS has previously focused on defense-in-depth techniques to 
secure network endpoints to prevent attacks in addition to implementing redundant 
architectures to cope with Byzantine faults.  BICS assumes integrity attacks will occur 
and focuses on detection mechanisms that can be used with mitigation techniques to 
minimize impact.  BICS incorporates consistency checking features while maintaining 
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network performance sufficient to operate with high bandwidth applications.  There has 
been no previous research that integrates features from existing security frameworks, 
such as BGP, with physical evidence in the ICS environment to develop a correlation-
based integrity evaluation method. 
The consistency checks in BICS make it very robust against integrity attacks.  Of 
the 343 trials reviewed, BICS was able to accurately identify all inconsistencies in the 
system.  In 64% of the total unique scenarios, BICS performed with greater than 70% 
accuracy and correctly detected nodes responsible for integrity issues.  No other existing 
frameworks, including general multi-agent implementations or specific techniques like 
Crutial information Switch, currently have the capability to accurately detect or mitigate 
the attacks in the same manner of BICS.  This demonstrates BICS effectiveness at 
combating a broad range of threats that impact the integrity of data in ICS. 
7.3 Recommendations for Future Research 
In the future, BICS accuracy and consistency to detect and locate integrity errors 
can be improved (Table 13).  BICS should be hardened against scenarios that reflect a 
high threat environment and where there is minimal protection in place at the nodes.  
Table 13 describes the areas where BICS accurately mitigated the attack scenarios and 
areas that can be improved.  Next to each factor is a rating of Low, Medium, or High.  An 
“Attacker Target Rate” of Low reflects a low threat environment.  A Low “Percent of 
Trusted Nodes” reveals that not many of your nodes are trustworthy to any degree.  
136 
 
Finally, a Low “Chance Trusted Node is Attacked Successfully” reflects that protected 
nodes are not likely to become compromised if attacked (e.g. if nodes are well-protected). 
Table 13: BICS Areas of Improvement. 
Attack Scenario Mitigated 
Attacker Target Rate: Low  Yes 
Attacker Target Rate: Medium  Yes 
Attacker Target Rate: High Partial 
Percent of Trusted Nodes: Low Partial 
Percent of Trusted Nodes: Medium Yes 
Percent of Trusted Nodes: High Yes 
Chance Trusted Node is Attacked Successfully: Low Yes 
Chance Trusted Node is Attacked Successfully: 
Medium 
Yes 
Chance Trusted Node is Attacked Successfully: High Partial 
 
A final area of research would be to evaluate the deployment of BICS at the field 
device layer.  It is anticipated that BICS could infer states of neighboring devices at the 
field device layer.  This could allow the field device to report its own state and the 
inferred state of a neighboring device. The management of neighboring nodes may 
require additional control logic.  In addition, this implementation may require additional 
bandwidth for the sending of additional messages.  However, it could provide another 
level of beliefs for a decision component to evaluate.  In addition, a key practical problem 
is evaluating the difficulty of checking for consistency in practice. 
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7.4 Concluding Thoughts 
This specific research was pursued because alternative security frameworks and 
technologies are needed to effectively secure ICS from integrity attacks.  This research 
has demonstrated that significant security gains can be achieved and secure operating 
environments can be developed. 
Failure to detect integrity errors in a system can lead to devastating consequences 
as demonstrated in earlier examples, including the Fork Shoals incident.  Checking for 
consistency among the states of physical devices in the Fork Shoals incident could have 
prevented the situation that transpired.  For instance, if ten devices were monitored and 
two provided inconsistent readings, BICS could have detected the anomaly and alerted 
the operator to prevent the accident from occurring.  Without BICS, operators did not 
respond appropriately to the data that unknowingly conflicted with the true state of the 
system.  If BICS was implemented in this case, a major oil spill and over $20 million 
dollars in damage may have been avoided.   
It is my goal for asset owners and system designers to consider the new approach 
provided by BICS in order to achieve secure operating environments!  
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VIII. APPENDIX: BICS SIMULATION DATA 
This appendix provides sample simulation data for each scenario executed in the 
OMNeT simulation.  The first section provides details for 20% (68/343) of use cases 
when BICS was not able to accurately detect the node responsible for the integrity errors.  
The second section provides details for 24% (85/343) of use cases where the BICS 
algorithm performed with accuracy from 1-99%.  The third section provides details for 
64% (219/343) of use cases where the BICS algorithm performed with accuracy greater 
than 70%.  The fourth section provides details for 55% (190/343) of use cases where the 
BICS algorithm performed with 100% accuracy.  The final section provides details for 
13% (43/343) of use cases where the BICS algorithm performed with 100% accuracy and 
AttackerTargetRate at least 50%. 
This information can be used to identify specific scenarios that yield the desired 
detection rate for BICS, given a known quantity of trusted nodes and protection for 
nodes.  For example, with a high threat environment (e.g. attacker target rate of 90%), an 
owner can determine how much protection to put in place for trusted nodes and how 





8.1 BICS Simulation Data – Accuracy 100% 












1 100 50 25 0 
2 100 50 33 0 
3 100 50 33 25 
4 100 50 50 0 
5 100 50 50 25 
6 100 50 50 33 
7 100 50 66 0 
8 100 50 66 25 
9 100 50 66 33 
10 100 50 75 0 
11 100 50 75 25 
12 100 50 75 33 
13 100 50 75 50 
14 100 50 75 66 
15 100 50 100 0 
16 100 50 100 25 
17 100 50 100 33 
18 100 50 100 50 
19 100 50 100 66 
20 100 66 50 0 
21 100 66 66 0 
22 100 66 66 25 
23 100 66 75 0 
24 100 66 75 25 
25 100 66 75 33 
26 100 66 100 0 
27 100 66 100 25 
28 100 66 100 33 
29 100 66 100 50 
30 100 75 50 0 
31 100 75 66 0 
32 100 75 66 25 
33 100 75 75 0 
34 100 75 75 25 
35 100 75 75 33 
36 100 75 100 0 
37 100 75 100 25 
38 100 75 100 33 
39 100 100 66 0 
40 100 100 75 0 
41 100 100 100 0 
42 100 100 100 25 





8.2 BICS Simulation Data – Accuracy 1-99% 












1 1 66 25 75 
2 1 66 33 100 
3 1 66 75 100 
4 1 75 25 25 
5 1 75 25 33 
6 1 75 33 50 
7 1 75 66 75 
8 1 100 100 66 
9 2 75 33 33 
10 3 66 25 66 
11 5 66 25 50 
12 5 66 33 66 
13 5 66 33 75 
14 5 75 33 25 
15 6 75 75 75 
16 8 75 25 0 
17 8 75 66 66 
18 8 100 66 33 
19 11 66 50 75 
20 13 66 25 33 
21 15 75 100 75 
22 16 75 50 50 
23 17 66 33 50 
24 17 75 75 66 
25 20 66 25 25 
26 23 66 66 75 
27 24 66 50 66 
28 27 66 75 75 
29 38 66 33 33 
30 41 100 66 25 
31 42 75 33 0 
32 47 50 66 100 
33 49 100 50 0 
34 50 100 75 33 
35 51 50 25 100 
36 51 66 33 25 
37 51 66 66 66 
38 53 50 0 0 
39 53 50 0 25 
40 53 50 0 33 
41 53 50 0 50 
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42 53 50 0 66 
43 53 50 0 75 
44 53 50 0 100 
45 53 50 50 100 
46 53 50 100 100 
47 54 100 100 50 
48 55 50 33 100 
49 55 75 100 66 
50 56 75 50 33 
51 57 66 50 50 
52 58 75 66 50 
53 59 66 25 0 
54 60 66 75 66 
55 61 50 75 100 
56 61 66 100 75 
57 73 50 25 75 
58 75 75 75 50 
59 76 50 33 75 
60 79 50 25 66 
61 80 50 33 66 
62 83 75 50 25 
63 86 66 100 66 
64 88 50 25 50 
65 88 66 66 50 
66 90 50 33 50 
67 91 50 50 75 
68 94 66 33 0 
69 94 100 75 25 
70 96 50 25 33 
71 96 66 50 33 
72 96 66 75 50 
73 96 75 66 33 
74 97 50 66 75 
75 97 50 100 75 
76 97 66 50 25 
77 98 50 25 25 
78 98 50 50 66 
79 99 50 33 33 
80 99 50 50 50 
81 99 50 66 50 
82 99 50 66 66 
83 99 50 75 75 
84 99 66 66 33 





8.3 BICS Simulation Data – Accuracy > 70% 












1 73 50 25 75 
2 75 75 75 50 
3 76 50 33 75 
4 79 50 25 66 
5 80 50 33 66 
6 83 75 50 25 
7 86 66 100 66 
8 88 50 25 50 
9 88 66 66 50 
10 90 50 33 50 
11 91 50 50 75 
12 94 66 33 0 
13 94 100 75 25 
14 96 50 25 33 
15 96 66 50 33 
16 96 66 75 50 
17 96 75 66 33 
18 97 50 66 75 
19 97 50 100 75 
20 97 66 50 25 
21 98 50 25 25 
22 98 50 50 66 
23 99 50 33 33 
24 99 50 50 50 
25 99 50 66 50 
26 99 50 66 66 
27 99 50 75 75 
28 99 66 66 33 
29 99 75 100 50 
30 100 0 0 0 
31 100 0 0 25 
32 100 0 0 33 
33 100 0 0 50 
34 100 0 0 66 
35 100 0 0 75 
36 100 0 0 100 
37 100 0 25 0 
38 100 0 25 25 
39 100 0 25 33 
40 100 0 25 50 
41 100 0 25 66 
42 100 0 25 75 
43 100 0 25 100 
44 100 0 33 0 
45 100 0 33 25 
46 100 0 33 33 
47 100 0 33 50 
48 100 0 33 66 
49 100 0 33 75 
50 100 0 33 100 
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51 100 0 50 0 
52 100 0 50 25 
53 100 0 50 33 
54 100 0 50 50 
55 100 0 50 66 
56 100 0 50 75 
57 100 0 50 100 
58 100 0 66 0 
59 100 0 66 25 
60 100 0 66 33 
61 100 0 66 50 
62 100 0 66 66 
63 100 0 66 75 
64 100 0 66 100 
65 100 0 75 0 
66 100 0 75 25 
67 100 0 75 33 
68 100 0 75 50 
69 100 0 75 66 
70 100 0 75 75 
71 100 0 75 100 
72 100 0 100 0 
73 100 0 100 25 
74 100 0 100 33 
75 100 0 100 50 
76 100 0 100 66 
77 100 0 100 75 
78 100 0 100 100 
79 100 25 0 0 
80 100 25 0 25 
81 100 25 0 33 
82 100 25 0 50 
83 100 25 0 66 
84 100 25 0 75 
85 100 25 0 100 
86 100 25 25 0 
87 100 25 25 25 
88 100 25 25 33 
89 100 25 25 50 
90 100 25 25 66 
91 100 25 25 75 
92 100 25 25 100 
93 100 25 33 0 
94 100 25 33 25 
95 100 25 33 33 
96 100 25 33 50 
97 100 25 33 66 
98 100 25 33 75 
99 100 25 33 100 
100 100 25 50 0 
101 100 25 50 25 
102 100 25 50 33 
103 100 25 50 50 
104 100 25 50 66 
105 100 25 50 75 
106 100 25 50 100 
107 100 25 66 0 
108 100 25 66 25 
109 100 25 66 33 
110 100 25 66 50 
144 
 
111 100 25 66 66 
112 100 25 66 75 
113 100 25 66 100 
114 100 25 75 0 
115 100 25 75 25 
116 100 25 75 33 
117 100 25 75 50 
118 100 25 75 66 
119 100 25 75 75 
120 100 25 75 100 
121 100 25 100 0 
122 100 25 100 25 
123 100 25 100 33 
124 100 25 100 50 
125 100 25 100 66 
126 100 25 100 75 
127 100 25 100 100 
128 100 33 0 0 
129 100 33 0 25 
130 100 33 0 33 
131 100 33 0 50 
132 100 33 0 66 
133 100 33 0 75 
134 100 33 0 100 
135 100 33 25 0 
136 100 33 25 25 
137 100 33 25 33 
138 100 33 25 50 
139 100 33 25 66 
140 100 33 25 75 
141 100 33 25 100 
142 100 33 33 0 
143 100 33 33 25 
144 100 33 33 33 
145 100 33 33 50 
146 100 33 33 66 
147 100 33 33 75 
148 100 33 33 100 
149 100 33 50 0 
150 100 33 50 25 
151 100 33 50 33 
152 100 33 50 50 
153 100 33 50 66 
154 100 33 50 75 
155 100 33 50 100 
156 100 33 66 0 
157 100 33 66 25 
158 100 33 66 33 
159 100 33 66 50 
160 100 33 66 66 
161 100 33 66 75 
162 100 33 66 100 
163 100 33 75 0 
164 100 33 75 25 
165 100 33 75 33 
166 100 33 75 50 
167 100 33 75 66 
168 100 33 75 75 
169 100 33 75 100 
170 100 33 100 0 
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171 100 33 100 25 
172 100 33 100 33 
173 100 33 100 50 
174 100 33 100 66 
175 100 33 100 75 
176 100 33 100 100 
177 100 50 25 0 
178 100 50 33 0 
179 100 50 33 25 
180 100 50 50 0 
181 100 50 50 25 
182 100 50 50 33 
183 100 50 66 0 
184 100 50 66 25 
185 100 50 66 33 
186 100 50 75 0 
187 100 50 75 25 
188 100 50 75 33 
189 100 50 75 50 
190 100 50 75 66 
191 100 50 100 0 
192 100 50 100 25 
193 100 50 100 33 
194 100 50 100 50 
195 100 50 100 66 
196 100 66 50 0 
197 100 66 66 0 
198 100 66 66 25 
199 100 66 75 0 
200 100 66 75 25 
201 100 66 75 33 
202 100 66 100 0 
203 100 66 100 25 
204 100 66 100 33 
205 100 66 100 50 
206 100 75 50 0 
207 100 75 66 0 
208 100 75 66 25 
209 100 75 75 0 
210 100 75 75 25 
211 100 75 75 33 
212 100 75 100 0 
213 100 75 100 25 
214 100 75 100 33 
215 100 100 66 0 
216 100 100 75 0 
217 100 100 100 0 
218 100 100 100 25 





8.4 BICS Simulation Data – Accuracy 100% 












1 100 0 0 0 
2 100 0 0 25 
3 100 0 0 33 
4 100 0 0 50 
5 100 0 0 66 
6 100 0 0 75 
7 100 0 0 100 
8 100 0 25 0 
9 100 0 25 25 
10 100 0 25 33 
11 100 0 25 50 
12 100 0 25 66 
13 100 0 25 75 
14 100 0 25 100 
15 100 0 33 0 
16 100 0 33 25 
17 100 0 33 33 
18 100 0 33 50 
19 100 0 33 66 
20 100 0 33 75 
21 100 0 33 100 
22 100 0 50 0 
23 100 0 50 25 
24 100 0 50 33 
25 100 0 50 50 
26 100 0 50 66 
27 100 0 50 75 
28 100 0 50 100 
29 100 0 66 0 
30 100 0 66 25 
31 100 0 66 33 
32 100 0 66 50 
33 100 0 66 66 
34 100 0 66 75 
35 100 0 66 100 
36 100 0 75 0 
37 100 0 75 25 
38 100 0 75 33 
39 100 0 75 50 
40 100 0 75 66 
41 100 0 75 75 
42 100 0 75 100 
43 100 0 100 0 
44 100 0 100 25 
45 100 0 100 33 
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46 100 0 100 50 
47 100 0 100 66 
48 100 0 100 75 
49 100 0 100 100 
50 100 25 0 0 
51 100 25 0 25 
52 100 25 0 33 
53 100 25 0 50 
54 100 25 0 66 
55 100 25 0 75 
56 100 25 0 100 
57 100 25 25 0 
58 100 25 25 25 
59 100 25 25 33 
60 100 25 25 50 
61 100 25 25 66 
62 100 25 25 75 
63 100 25 25 100 
64 100 25 33 0 
65 100 25 33 25 
66 100 25 33 33 
67 100 25 33 50 
68 100 25 33 66 
69 100 25 33 75 
70 100 25 33 100 
71 100 25 50 0 
72 100 25 50 25 
73 100 25 50 33 
74 100 25 50 50 
75 100 25 50 66 
76 100 25 50 75 
77 100 25 50 100 
78 100 25 66 0 
79 100 25 66 25 
80 100 25 66 33 
81 100 25 66 50 
82 100 25 66 66 
83 100 25 66 75 
84 100 25 66 100 
85 100 25 75 0 
86 100 25 75 25 
87 100 25 75 33 
88 100 25 75 50 
89 100 25 75 66 
90 100 25 75 75 
91 100 25 75 100 
92 100 25 100 0 
93 100 25 100 25 
94 100 25 100 33 
95 100 25 100 50 
96 100 25 100 66 
97 100 25 100 75 
98 100 25 100 100 
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99 100 33 0 0 
100 100 33 0 25 
101 100 33 0 33 
102 100 33 0 50 
103 100 33 0 66 
104 100 33 0 75 
105 100 33 0 100 
106 100 33 25 0 
107 100 33 25 25 
108 100 33 25 33 
109 100 33 25 50 
110 100 33 25 66 
111 100 33 25 75 
112 100 33 25 100 
113 100 33 33 0 
114 100 33 33 25 
115 100 33 33 33 
116 100 33 33 50 
117 100 33 33 66 
118 100 33 33 75 
119 100 33 33 100 
120 100 33 50 0 
121 100 33 50 25 
122 100 33 50 33 
123 100 33 50 50 
124 100 33 50 66 
125 100 33 50 75 
126 100 33 50 100 
127 100 33 66 0 
128 100 33 66 25 
129 100 33 66 33 
130 100 33 66 50 
131 100 33 66 66 
132 100 33 66 75 
133 100 33 66 100 
134 100 33 75 0 
135 100 33 75 25 
136 100 33 75 33 
137 100 33 75 50 
138 100 33 75 66 
139 100 33 75 75 
140 100 33 75 100 
141 100 33 100 0 
142 100 33 100 25 
143 100 33 100 33 
144 100 33 100 50 
145 100 33 100 66 
146 100 33 100 75 
147 100 33 100 100 
148 100 50 25 0 
149 100 50 33 0 
150 100 50 33 25 
151 100 50 50 0 
149 
 
152 100 50 50 25 
153 100 50 50 33 
154 100 50 66 0 
155 100 50 66 25 
156 100 50 66 33 
157 100 50 75 0 
158 100 50 75 25 
159 100 50 75 33 
160 100 50 75 50 
161 100 50 75 66 
162 100 50 100 0 
163 100 50 100 25 
164 100 50 100 33 
165 100 50 100 50 
166 100 50 100 66 
167 100 66 50 0 
168 100 66 66 0 
169 100 66 66 25 
170 100 66 75 0 
171 100 66 75 25 
172 100 66 75 33 
173 100 66 100 0 
174 100 66 100 25 
175 100 66 100 33 
176 100 66 100 50 
177 100 75 50 0 
178 100 75 66 0 
179 100 75 66 25 
180 100 75 75 0 
181 100 75 75 25 
182 100 75 75 33 
183 100 75 100 0 
184 100 75 100 25 
185 100 75 100 33 
186 100 100 66 0 
187 100 100 75 0 
188 100 100 100 0 
189 100 100 100 25 






8.5 BICS Simulation Data – Accuracy 100%, AttackerTargetRate >= 50% 












1 100 50 25 0 
2 100 50 33 0 
3 100 50 33 25 
4 100 50 50 0 
5 100 50 50 25 
6 100 50 50 33 
7 100 50 66 0 
8 100 50 66 25 
9 100 50 66 33 
10 100 50 75 0 
11 100 50 75 25 
12 100 50 75 33 
13 100 50 75 50 
14 100 50 75 66 
15 100 50 100 0 
16 100 50 100 25 
17 100 50 100 33 
18 100 50 100 50 
19 100 50 100 66 
20 100 66 50 0 
21 100 66 66 0 
22 100 66 66 25 
23 100 66 75 0 
24 100 66 75 25 
25 100 66 75 33 
26 100 66 100 0 
27 100 66 100 25 
28 100 66 100 33 
29 100 66 100 50 
30 100 75 50 0 
31 100 75 66 0 
32 100 75 66 25 
33 100 75 75 0 
34 100 75 75 25 
35 100 75 75 33 
36 100 75 100 0 
37 100 75 100 25 
38 100 75 100 33 
39 100 100 66 0 
40 100 100 75 0 
41 100 100 100 0 
42 100 100 100 25 





      
[1]  National Transportation Safety Board (NTSB) - NTSB/PAR-98-01; PB98-916502, 
“Pipeline Rupture and Release of Fuel Oil into the Reedy River Fork Shoals, 
South Carolina,” 26 June 1996. [Online]. Available: 
http://www.ntsb.gov/doclib/reports/1998/PAR9801.pdf. 
[2]  National Transportation Safety Board (NTSB) - NTSB/PAR-02/02; PB2002-
916502, "Pipeline Rupture and Subsequent Fire in Bellingham, Washington," 10 
June 1999. [Online]. Available: 
http://www.ntsb.gov/doclib/reports/2002/PAR0202.pdf. 
[3]  F. Y. Rashid, "ICS-CERT: Response to Cyber 'Incidents' Against Critical 
Infrastructure Jumped 52 Percent in 2012," Security Week, 10 January 2013. 
[Online]. Available: http://www.securityweek.com/ics-cert-response-cyber-
incidents-against-critical-infrastructure-jumped-52-percent-2012. [Accessed 1 
March 2014]. 
[4]  ICS-CERT Control Systems Security Program, “ICS-CERT Incident Response 





[5]  Symantec: Nicolas Falliere, Liam O Murchu, and Eric Chien, “W32.Stuxnet 
Dossier,” February 2011. [Online]. Available: 
http://www.symantec.com/content/en/us/enterprise/media/security_response/white
papers/w32_stuxnet_dossier.pdf. 
[6]  T. Macaulay and B. Singer, Cyber Security for Industrial Control Systems: 
SCADA, DCS, PLC, HMI, and SIS, Boca Raton: CRC Press, 2012.  
[7]  S. A. Boyer, SCADA Supervisory Control and Data Acquisition - 4th Edition, 
Research Triangle Park, NC: International Society of Automation, 2010.  
[8]  K. Stouffer, J. Falco and K. Scarfone, NIST Guide to Industrial Control Systems 
(ICS) Security. NIST-SP-800-82-2011, Gaithersburg, MD: National Institute of 
Standards and Technology, U.S. Department of Commerce, 2011.  
[9]  Massachusetts Institute of Technology, "Chapter 9: Data Communications, 
Cybersecurity, and Information Privacy," MIT Study on the Future of the Electric 
Grid, 2012. [Online]. Available: 
http://mitei.mit.edu/system/files/Electric_Grid_9_Data_Communications_Cyberse
curity_Information_Privacy.pdf. [Accessed 2012]. 
153 
 
[10]  H. Devold, Oil and Gas Production Handbook: An introduction to oil and gas 
production, ABB ATPA Oil and Gas, 2006.  
[11]  Office of the National Coordinator for Smart Grid Interoperability, “NIST 
framework and roadmap for smart grid interoperability standards, release 1.0,” 
U.S. Department of Commerce and National Institute of Standards and 
Technology, NIST Special Publication 1108, 2010. [Online]. Available: 
http://www.nist.gov/public_affairs/releases/upload/smartgrid_interoperability_fina
l.pdf. 
[12]  M. Amin S. and A. M. Giacomoni, "Smart Grid—Safe, Secure, Self-Healing," 
IEEE Power & Energy Magazine, 2012. [Online]. Available: http://magazine.ieee-
pes.org/january-february-2012/smart-grid-safe-secure-self-healing/. [Accessed 29 
March 2014]. 
[13]  K. Wilhoit, “Who’s Really Attacking Your ICS Equipment?,” Trend Micro 
Incorporated, 2013. 
[14]  K. Wilhoit, “The SCADA That Didn't Cry Wolf: Who's Really Attacking Your 
ICS Equipment? (Part 2),” Trend Micro, 1 August 2013. [Online]. Available: 
https://media.blackhat.com/us-13/US-13-Wilhoit-The-SCADA-That-Didnt-Cry-




[15]  E. Markey and H. A. Waxman, “A Spotlight on Grid Insecurity,” Net-
Security.org, 23 May 2013. [Online]. Available: http://www.net-
security.org/secworld.php?id=14949. [Accessed May 2013]. 
[16]  US-CERT, Recommended Practice: Improving Industrial Control Systems 
Cybersecurity with Defense-In-Depth Strategies, Department of Homeland 
Security's United States Computer Emergency Readiness Team (US-CERT), 
2009.  
[17]  Office of the National Coordinator for Smart Grid Interoperability, “NIST 
framework and roadmap for smart grid interoperability standards, release 1.0,” 
U.S. Department of Commerce and National Institute of Standards and 
Technology, NIST Special Publication 1108, 2010.  
[18]  National Security Agency, “Defense in Depth: A practical strategy for achieving 
Information Assurance in today’s highly networked environments,” [Online]. 
Available: http://www.nsa.gov/ia/_files/support/defenseindepth.pdf. 
[19]  US-CERT, “Recommended Practice: Improving Industrial Control Systems 
Cybersecurity with Defense-In-Depth Strategies,” Department of Homeland 
Security's United States Computer Emergency Readiness Team (US-CERT), 
155 
 
October 2009. [Online]. Available: http://www.us-
cert.gov/control_systems/practices/documents/Defense_in_Depth_Oct09.pdf. 
[Accessed 2012]. 
[20]  U.S. DHS ICS-CERT, "Gas Pipeline Cyber Intrusion Campaign," April 2012. 
[Online]. Available: http://www.us-cert.gov/control_systems/pdf/ICS-
CERT_Monthly_Monitor_Apr2012.pdf. [Accessed 2012]. 
[21]  J. C. Rebane, The Stuxnet Computer Worm and Industrial Control System 
Security, New York: Nova Science Publishers, Inc., 2011.  
[22]  CSIS: Center for Strategic & International Studies, "Significant Cyber Events," 30 
January 2014. [Online]. Available: 
http://csis.org/files/publication/140204_Significant_Cyber_Incidents_Since_2006.
pdf. [Accessed 01 February 2014]. 
[23]  Industrial Control Systems Cyber Emergency Response Team Control Systems 
Security Program, “ICS-TIP-12-146-01—TARGETED CYBER INTRUSION 
DETECTION AND MITIGATION STRATEGIES,” 25 May 2012. [Online]. 
Available: http://www.us-cert.gov/control_systems/pdf/ICS-TIP-12-146-01.pdf. 
[24]  V. M. Igure, S. A. Laughter and R. D. Williams, "Security issues in SCADA 
networks," Computers & Security, vol. 25, no. 7, pp. 498-506, 7 October, 2006.  
156 
 
[25]  E. Udassin, "Control system attack vectors and examples: field site and corporate 
network," C4 Security: Presented at the S4 Conference, 2008. [Online]. Available: 
http://c4-security.com/SCADA%20Security%20-%20Attack%20Vectors.pdf. 
[Accessed 2012]. 
[26]  K. Zetter, "10K Reasons to Worry About Critical Infrastructure," 24 January 2012. 
[Online]. Available: http://www.wired.com/threatlevel/2012/01/10000-control-
systems-online/. [Accessed 2012]. 
[27]  J. Matherly, "SHODAN - Computer Search Engine: Expose Online Devices," 
[Online]. Available: http://www.shodanhq.com/. [Accessed 2012]. 
[28]  A. Ginter, "An IT Perspective of Control Systems Security," Industrial Defender, 
Inc, October 2009. [Online]. Available: 
http://www.industrialdefender.com/general_downloads/whitepapers/ginter_it-
perspective.pdf. [Accessed 2012]. 
[29]  C. Arnold, J. Butts and K. Thirunarayan, “Strategies for Combating Sophisticated 
Attacks,” Journal of Information Warfare, vol. 12, no. 1, pp. 11-21, 2013.  
[30]  U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission, "NRC Information Notice: 2007-15: 
Effects of Ethernet-Based, Non-Safety Related Controls on the Safe and 




notices/2007/in200715.pdf. [Accessed 2012]. 
[31]  J. Weiss, Protecting Industrial Control Systems from Electronic Threats, New 
York: Momentum Press, 2010.  
[32]  M. Niland, "Computer virus brings down train signals," Information Week, 
August 2003. [Online]. Available: 
http://www.informationweek.com/news/security/vulnerabilities/showArticle.jhtml
?articleID=13100807. 
[33]  K. Poulsen, "Slammer worm crashed Ohio nuke plant network," SecurityFocus, 
August 2003. [Online]. Available: http://www.securityfocus.com/news/6767. 
[34]  D. Fineren and A. Bakr, “Saudi Aramco repairing damage from computer attack,” 
26 August 2012. [Online]. Available: 
http://in.reuters.com/article/2012/08/26/saudi-aramco-hacking-
idINL5E8JQ43P20120826. 
[35]  L. Nasseri, “Iran Computer Worm Targets Oil Ministry, State Companies,” 23 




[36]  M. Brunner, H. K. C. Hofinger, C. Roblee, P. Schoo and S. Todt, “Infiltrating 




[37]  J. Slay and M. Miller, "Lessons learned from Maroochy water breach," IFIP 
International Federation for Information Processing, vol. 253, pp. 73-82, 2008.  
[38]  National Transportation Safety Board (NTSB) - NTSB/PAR-02/02; PB2002-
916502, “Pipeline Rupture and Subsequent Fire in Bellingham, Washington,” 10 
June 1999. [Online]. Available: 
http://www.ntsb.gov/doclib/reports/2002/PAR0202.pdf. 
[39]  ICS-CERT, "Overview of Cyber Vulnerabilities," Department of Homeland 
Security, [Online]. Available: http://ics-cert.us-cert.gov/content/overview-cyber-
vulnerabilities#change. [Accessed 30 March 2014]. 
[40]  Industrial Control Systems Cyber Emergency Response Team, “ICS-ALERT-11-
343-01—CONTROL SYSTEM INTERNET ACCESSIBILITY,” 09 December 




[41]  L. Lamport, R. Shostak and M. Pease, “The Byzantine Generals Problem,” ACM 
Transactions on Programming Languages and Systems (TOPLAS), vol. 4, no. 3, 
pp. 382-401, July 1982.  
[42]  Wikipedia, "Byzantine Fault Tolerance," Wikipedia, 01 May 2012. [Online]. 
Available: http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Byzantine_fault_tolerance. [Accessed 23 
April 2014]. 
[43]  M. Castro and B. Liskov, "Practical Byzantine Fault Tolerance," in Proceedings of 
the Third Symposium on Operating Systems Design and Implementation, New 
Orleans, 1999.  
[44]  P. S. Minor, M. Malekpour and W. Torres, "A conceptual design for a reliable 
optical bus (ROBUS)," in Digital Avionics Systems Conference, 2002. 
Proceedings. The 21st. Vol. 2. IEEE., 2002.  
[45]  H. J. LeBlanc, H. Zhang, S. Sundaram and X. Koutsoukos, "Consensus of Multi-
Agent Networks in the Presence of Adversaries Using Only Local Information," in 
HiCoNS’12, Beijing, 2012.  
[46]  P. Veríssimo, N. F. Neves and M. Correia, “The CRUTIAL reference critical 
information infrastructure architecture: A blueprint,” International Journal of 
System of Systems Engineering, vol. 1, pp. 78-95, 2008.  
160 
 
[47]  A. N. Bessani, P. Sousa, M. Correia, N. F. Neves and P. Veríssimo, “The Crutial 
Way of Critical Infrastructure Protection,” IEEE Security & Privacy: Process 
Control Security, pp. 44-51, November 2008.  
[48]  W. Hamscher, L. Console and J. DeKleer, Readings in Model-Based Diagnosis, 
San Mateo, CA: Morgan Kaufmann Publishers, 1992.  
[49]  Wikipedia, "Model-based reasoning," Wikipedia, 29 May 2014. [Online]. 
Available: http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Model-based_reasoning. [Accessed 29 
May 2014]. 
[50]  J. DeKleer and J. S. Brown, "A Qualitative Physics Based on Confluences," 
Artificial Intelligence, vol. 24, pp. 7-83, 1984.  
[51]  J. DeKleer and B. C. Williams, "Diagnosing Multiple Faults," Artificial 
Intelligence 32, pp. 97-130, 1987.  
[52]  L. J. Holtzblatt, "Diagnosing Multiple Failures Using Knowledge of Component 
States," in Proceedings of the 4th IEEE Conference on AI Applications, San 
Diego, CA, 1988.  
[53]  F. Finch and M. Kramer, "Qualitative Modeling and Fault Diagnosis of Dynamic 
Processes by MIDAS," in AIChE Spring National Meeting, Houston, 1989.  
161 
 
[54]  Wikipedia, "Petri net," Wikipedia, 25 January 2014. [Online]. Available: 
http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Petri_net. [Accessed 25 January 2014]. 
[55]  T. M. Chen, J. C. Sanchez-Aarnoutse and J. Buford, "Petri Net Modeling of 
Cyber-Physical Attacks on Smart Grid," IEEE TRANSACTIONS ON SMART 
GRID, vol. 2, no. 4, pp. 741-749, 2011.  
[56]  O. Gursesli and A. A. Desrochers, "Modeling Infrastructure Interdependencies 
Using Petri Nets," in IEEE International Conference on Systems, Man and 
Cybernetics, Oct. 2003, vol. 2, pp. 1506–1512.  
[57]  C. Ten, C. Liu and G. Manimaran, "Vulnerability Assessment of Cybersecurity for 
SCADA Systems," IEEE Transactions on Power Systems, vol. 23, no. 4, pp. 1836 
- 1846, November 2008.  
[58]  F. V. Jensen and T. D. Nielsen, Bayesian Networks and Decision Graphs, Second 
Edition, New York: Springer Science + Business Media, LLC, 2007.  
[59]  N. S. Sulaiman, "Decision Making for Pipeline Maintenance using Bayesian 
Network Modeling," 24 January 2014. [Online]. Available: 
http://homepages.abdn.ac.uk/h.tan/pages/subsea/LRF-slides-Nurul-1.pdf. 
[Accessed 24 January 2014]. 
162 
 
[60]  C. Queiroz, A. Mahmood and Z. Tari, "Survivable SCADA Systems: An 
analytical framework using performance modelling," Global Telecommunications 
Conference (GLOBECOM 2010), IEEE, pp. 1-5, 2010.  
[61]  H. Nouredine, C. Tranchita, B. Rozel, M. Viziteu and R. Caire, "Modeling cyber 
and physical interdependencies-Application in ICT and power grids," Power 
Systems Conference and Exposition, PSCE'09, IEEE/PES, pp. 1-6, 2009.  
[62]  A. Di Giorgio and F. Liberati, "Interdependency modeling and analysis of critical 
infrastructures based on Dynamic Bayesian Networks," Control & Automation 
(MED), 2011 19th Mediterranean Conference, IEEE, pp. 791-797, 2011.  
[63]  R. Buxton, U. S.R. and A. King, "Modelling Interdependences of Critical 
Infrastructure," in 2010 NZSEE Conference, 2010.  
[64]  A. Davis, "DEVELOPING SCADA SIMULATIONS WITH C2WINDTUNNEL," 
May 2011. [Online]. Available: http://etd.library.vanderbilt.edu/available/etd-
04052011-071956/unrestricted/edt.pdf. [Accessed January 2014]. 
[65]  A. Varga, "OMNeT++," 1997. [Online]. Available: http://www.omnetpp.org. 
[Accessed 08 December 2013]. 
[66]  A. Varga and R. Hornig, "An Overview of the OMNeT++ Simulation 
163 
 
Environment," in Proceedings of the 1st International Conference on Simulation 
Tools and Techniques for Communications, Networks and Systems & Workshops, 
SimuTools 2008, Marseille, France, 2008.  
[67]  L. McMinn, J. Butts, D. Robinson and B. Rios, "Exploiting the Critical 
Infrastructure via Nontraditional System Inputs," in CSIIRW '11, Oak Ridge, 2011.  
[68]  Y. Lindell, A. Lysyanskaya and T. Rabin, “On the composition of authenticated 
Byzantine Agreement,” Journal of the ACM (JACM), vol. 56, no. 6, pp. 881-917, 
November 2006.  
[69]  F. Pasqualetti, A. Bicchi and F. Bullo, “Consensus Computation in Unreliable 
Networks: A System Theoretic Approach,” Automatic Control, IEEE 
Transactions, vol. 57, no. 1, pp. 90-104, January 2012.  
[70]  T. Moscibroda, S. Schmid and R. Wattenhofer, “When selfish meets evil: 
byzantine players in a virus inoculation game,” in Proceedings of the twenty-fifth 
annual ACM symposium on Principles of distributed computing, Denver, 2006.  
[71]  S. Sundaram, S. Revzen and G. Pappas, “A control-theoretic approach to 
disseminating values and overcoming malicious links in wireless networks,” 
Automatica (Journal of IFAC), vol. 48, no. 11, pp. 2894-2901, November 2012.  
164 
 
[72]  C.-F. Cheng and K.-T. Tsai, “From immediate agreement to eventual agreement: 
early stopping agreement protocol for dynamic networks with malicious faulty 
processors,” The Journal of Supercomputing, vol. 62, no. 2, pp. 874-894, 
November 2012.  
[73]  K. -Q. Yan and S. -C. Wang, “Visiting Byzantine Agreement underlying Ad Hoc 
environment,” Journal of Computer and Systems Sciences International, vol. 46, 
no. 1, p. 127, 2007.  
[74]  Z. Ma (Sam) and A. W. Krings, “Dynamic hybrid fault models and the 
applications to wireless sensor networks (WSNs),” in Proceedings of the 11th 
international symposium on Modeling, analysis and simulation of wireless and 
mobile systems, Vancouver, 2008.  
[75]  H. Geffner and J. Pearl, "Distributed Diagnosis of Systems with Multiple Faults," 
in Proceedings of the 3rd IEEE Conference on AI Applications, Kissimmee, 1987.  
 
 
 
